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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]here is no immediate urgency about defining the upper
boundary of "airspace" or reaching international agreement on
the upward or outward extent of territorial sovereignty in space.
- The Honorable John A. Johnson, First General Counsel of the U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1959. 1
I see no good reason for postponing a systematic effort to ex-
plore and reach agreement on this question of delimiting the
upward reach of territorial sovereignty, that is, the exclusive
power and authority of the underlying state. It is not the kind of
question, in my opinion, that will be answered by the accumula-
tion of scientific knowledge or by further experience in space
technology.
- The Honorable John A. Johnson, First General Counsel of the U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 19612
T HE DEBATE OVER the delineation of the boundary be-
tween state sovereignty and "outer space," or the vertical
limitation of state sovereignty, predates the space age. Many ar-
ticles were written on the subject in the 1950s as the space age
was dawning. However, the debate did not begin then; instead,
it began during the early days of aircraft flight and unfortu-
nately continues into the twenty-first century. Because there is
no agreed delineation between a state's territory and free outer
space, the vertical limit of state sovereignty is unsettled and each
state is left to define the limits of its vertical sovereignty. How-
ever, no state has explicitly done this.
There are several reasons why delineation is important today.
First, new technologies are under development that may soon
allow various types of vehicles to operate at a high altitude. Sev-
eral concepts for intercontinental vehicles, operational in the
upper atmosphere, are under development. Additionally, sub-
orbital space tourism is nearing commercial application. Fi-
nally, senior members of the U.S. Air Force have expressed an
interest in operations in what they have termed "near space,"
the part of the atmosphere between 65,000 feet (about 12.3
1 John A. Johnson, Address Before the House Committee on Science (Mar. 11,
1959), in Colonel Martin Menter, Astronautical Law 30 (1959) (unpublished the-
sis, Industrial College of the Armed Forces) (on file with the McGill University
Nahum Gelber Law Library).
2 John A. Johnson (Apr. 28, 1961), in 55 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 165, 167
(1961) [hereinafter Johnson, PROCEEDINGS].
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miles or 19.8 kilometers) and 186 miles (300 kilometers).' This
area is above the altitude at which conventional aircraft nor-
mally operate and below the closest point to the Earth of the
orbit, or perigee,4 of most satellites. 5
Delineation is important to ensure equal access to space. Al-
though outer space is free,' if states are allowed to claim vertical
sovereignty up to the point where orbital dynamics are possible,
other states will be precluded from having free access to space.7
Setting a low limit of vertical sovereignty will allow launching
states the potential of freely accessing space, but neighboring
states could still legitimately express concerns based on safety.8
Mr. John A. Johnson, the first General Counsel of the U.S. Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and for-
merly the General Counsel of the U.S. Air Force,9 said in 1964,
"there should therefore be no legal basis for protesting, merely on
grounds of unpermitted presence, the overflight of national territory
by ascending and descending spacecraft, regardless of alti-
tude."' Setting a low limit on state sovereignty does not mean
3 See Lorenzo Cortes, Air Force Chief Cites Vitality of "Near Space" Capabilities, DEF.
DAILY, Sept. 16, 2004.
4 "The point on an elliptical orbit at which the satellite is closest to the Earth is
called the perigee of the orbit, and the point at which it is furthest from the
Earth is called the apogee." DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYwsIcs OF SPACE SECURITY
24 (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global-security/space-weapons/
the-physics-of-space-security.html.
5 See David Bond, Persistent Perspective, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 20, 2004, at
19.
6 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. I,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]
("Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of celestial bodies.").
7 In 1964, Mr. Johnson said,
It is evident that if territorial sovereignty-that is, the exclusive con-
trol of the underlying State which now applies to the area denomi-
nated "air space"-is to embrace the entire space below the lowest
altitude at which the orbiting of earth satellites has occurred, man
will not-to use Ambassador Stevenson's words-"be free to ven-
ture into space on the same basis that he has ventured on the high
seas."
John A. Johnson, Freedom and Control in Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CON-
FERENCE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND SPACE LAw 138, 140 (Mortimer D. Schwartz ed.,
1964) [hereinafter Johnson, Freedom and Control].
See Air Force Aide Named Space Agency Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1958, at 10.
Id.
10 Johnson, Freedom and Control, supra note 7, at 141 (emphasis added).
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that states will have total freedom of action.1" Even in space,
states cannot take actions that harm the interests of other
states. 2 But states will have to point to a legitimate safety con-
cern before objecting to another state's activities.'" They will
not be able to object merely on the basis of overflight.' 4 This
should encourage states to work together to draft uniform rules
of operation.
Another issue raised by the absence of an international defini-
tion of the space boundary is liability for space activities. 15 Vehi-
cles operating at high altitude, but not in orbit, may not be
covered by either the Convention on INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS1 6 (the Liability Conven-
tion) or the Convention for International Carriage by Air 17 (the
Montreal Convention), so parties presumably would have to use
domestic tort law to determine liability. As more vehicles oper-
ate in the upper atmosphere, liability claims are likely to in-
crease. An international agreement that "space" begins above a
certain altitude could provide certainty for liability by defining
the term "space object." If a space object caused damage on the
ground or to aircraft in flight, the liability convention would ap-
ply, and the absolute liability it provides would come into play.18
Other international agreements also could benefit from a pre-
cise delineation of vertical sovereignty. For example, the Pre-
liminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets,
prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT) as a protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (opened for signa-
l1 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 6, art. IX.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Johnson, Freedom and Control, supra note 17, at 141.
15 See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Con-
vention]; Convention for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. The
Montreal Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or
cargo performed by aircraft for reward." Id. art. 1(1). The Convention does not
define the term "aircraft." See id.
16 See generally Liability Convention, supra note 15. See infra notes 335 - 339,
351 and accompanying text.
17 See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 15.
18 Article II of the Liability Convention provides: "A launching State shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on
the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight." Liability Convention, supra note
15, ART. II.
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ture on November 16, 2001), does not define space, although
this term is pivotal in determining the application of the
protocol."
The increased activity in the upper atmosphere (or in near
space) should be governed by uniform international rules.20
For safety reasons, it would be beneficial to have uniform stan-
dards similar to those that exist for operations in the lower at-
mosphere.2 1 Uniformity is "more often than not a precondition
for safety. ' 22 One possibility would be to have the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 23 develop these standards as
it does for operations in international airspace. 24
Finally, states must know the limits of other states' sovereignty
to avoid conflict along the borders. The time has come to settle
this gap in the law.
II. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. VERTICAL SOVEREIGNTY
States have exercised sovereignty over the space above land at
least as far back as the Roman Empire. 2' Roman law (and the
19 See Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/publications/proceedings/2004/study/72j/s-72j-
13rev-e.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). For example, the draft protocol states:
"space assets" means:
(i) any identifiable asset that is intended to be launched and placed
in space or that is in space;
(ii) any identifiable asset assembled or manufactured in space;
(iii) any identifiable launch vehicle that is expendable or can be
reused to transport persons or goods to and from space; and
(iv) any separately identifiable component forming a part of an as-
set referred to in the preceding sub-paragraphs or attached to or
contained within such asset.
As used in this definition, the term "space" means outer space, in-
cluding the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Id. art. I(g) (footnotes omitted).
20 See MYRES S. McDouGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 590 (1963).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 43, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] ("An organization to be
named the International Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Conven-
tion. It is made up of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be
necessary.").
24 See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
25 John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus est solum" in Interna-
tional Air Law, reprinted in JOHN COBB COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW
54, 57-58 (1968) [hereinafter COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW].
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law of succeeding states) recognized, regulated, and protected
private rights in space above the surface.2 6 Because a state can-
not impose its will within the territory of another state, these
states therefore claimed territorial sovereignty above their sur-
face territory.27 Although writers generally agree that Roman
law recognized private rights in air space, the writers do not
agree on the extent of the right recognized.2 a
At the beginning of the twentieth century, "international
flight was practically unregulated. ' 29 In 1902, Paul Fauchille of
France, Rapporteur for the Institute of International Law on the
subject of the legal status of the airships, proposed that states
should only have exclusive rights in the airspace immediately
over their territory up to an altitude of 1,500 meters (4,920
feet). ° Some of Fauchille's proposals were translated by Profes-
sor John C. Cooper as follows:
the air is free-States having only rights necessary for their self-
preservation, such rights relating to the prevention of spying, to
the customs, to the sanitary police, and to the necessities of de-
fense; subject to certain exceptions, air navigation is prohibited
in a "security" zone extending 1500 meters up from the surface
territory of a State; only public aircraft of a State are permitted to
fly freely in the security zone of that State; the subjacent State
may also regulate landing and departure through the security
zone above its territory ...."
The opposite view was expressed in 1906 by Professor John
Westlake of the United Kingdom who advocated no upward
limit of state sovereignty: 2
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 59.
29 John Cobb Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910, 19
J. AIR L. & CoM. 127 (1952) [hereinafter Cooper, Air Navigation Conference], re-
printed in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra note 25, at 104, 106
(noting that German zeppelins flew over Switzerland and German balloons fre-
quently landed in France).
30 NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AIRSPACE OF THE HIGH
SEAs, in 14 UTRECHT STUDIES IN AIR AND SPACE LAw 50-51 (G.C.M. Reijnen et al.
eds., 1994).
31 John Cobb Cooper, A Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft [hereinafter Cooper,
A Study], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra note 25, at 205, 218
(footnotes omitted).
32 John Cobb Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty [hereinafter
Cooper, High Altitude Flight], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra
note 25, at 256, 258.
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In the air the higher one ascends, the more damage the fall of
objects will cause on the earth. If there exists a limit as to the
sovereignty of the State over the oceanic space, none exists for
the sovereignty of the State over the air space. The right of the
subjacent State remains the same whatever may be the distance.33
Professor Westlake did support "a right of innocent passage for
foreign aircraft such as international law recognized for surface
vessels through" territorial seas. 4 In 1910, Fauchille revised his
suggestion by decreasing the vertical limit of state sovereignty to
only 500 meters (1,640 feet). 5 The same year, Dr. J. F.
Lycklama A Nijeholt published a book asserting there was no up-
per limit on state sovereignty.3 6 "We therefore conclude that
state sovereignty reaches quite as high as the state's interest can
reach, the possibility of which but ends at the uttermost limit of
the atmosphere. 3 7
In May and June of 1910, "[t] he first diplomatic conference to
consider flight regulation met in Paris."38 During the confer-
ence, France tried to "avoid a decision on the question of free-
dom of flight-space or State sovereignty. . . [France] thus
adopted in principle the position which had been taken by Paul
Fauchille."39 The United Kingdom recognized full sovereignty
rights of states over their flight-space and did not recognize a
right of innocent passage. 40 Germany believed that states had
"full and absolute territorial sovereignty in usable space" over
their lands, but would have allowed aircraft of a contracting
state to take off, land, and fly over other contracting states.4'
33 Id. (quoting Professor Westlake).
34 Cooper, Air Navigation Conference, supra note 29, at 112.
35 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 51; Cooper, A Study, supra note 31, at 221.
Fauchille since 1901 had been the leading advocate of freedom of
flight-space, opposing the principle of State sovereignty .... In
1910 he began to seek general acceptance of the formula "air navi-
gation is free" as a compromise. However, he personally never re-
ceded from his original 1902 position that "the air is free."
Cooper, Air Navigation Conference, supra note 29, at 109 n.15.
36 Professor Cooper described Dr. Nijeholt's book as "a far-sighted and now
classic treatise on 'Air Sovereignty."' John Cobb Cooper, Flight Space and the Satel-
lites, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 83 (1958).
37 J. F. LYCKLAMAANIJEHOLT, AIR SOVEREIGNTY 46 (1910). Dr. Nijeholt summa-
rized and critiqued the views of her contemporaries as well, including Fauchille
and Westlake. See id. at 9-21.
38 Cooper, Air Navigation Conference, supra note 29, at 105.
39 Id. at 108-09.
40 Id. at 112-13.
41 Id. at 110-11.
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Similar to the position of the United States during the drafting
of the Chicago Convention in 194442 and today, Germany's posi-
tion may be explained because
its great technical progress in the design and construction of the
zeppelins and other dirigibles for both military and civil use had
put it so far ahead of other European powers that it would have
much to gain and little to lose by an exchange of the widest possi-
ble flight privileges.43
Although the diplomatic conference adjourned without sign-
ing a convention, it had completed most of the clauses of a draft
convention.44 The 1910 conference "first evidenced general in-
ternational agreement that usable space above the lands and wa-
ters of a State is part of the territory of that State" and that no
general right of innocent passage through the usable space
above a state existed for aircraft. 45 The conference did not set a
vertical limit on state sovereignty.46
After the 1910 Paris conference ended without agreement,
many European states asserted absolute vertical sovereignty.4 7
Interestingly, although German balloon flights over France
prior to 1914 are often discussed, in 1914 Germany cited French
military aviators flying over German and Belgian areas as one of
its reasons for declaring war on France.48 Professor Cooper
translated a relevant part of the "little known and seldom read
German Declaration of War on France" as:
The German administrative and military authorities have estab-
lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on
42 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
43 Cooper, Air Navigation Conference, supra note 29, at 119.
- Id. at 105.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 123.
In the French statement on the entry of foreign aircraft a recom-
mendation was made that the convention should include a restric-
tion prohibiting aircraft navigating below a height to be stated in
the convention, so as to protect the population against the indiscre-
tions of aircraft and the noise of their motors. The German delega-
tion opposed this proposal and it had no support. The draft
convention as approved by the conference and the rules adopted
by the First Commission all dealt with flight-space as being subject
to uniform regulation at whatever height used. The conference
clearly rejected any division of usable space into horizontal zones.
Id.
47 John Cobb Cooper, State Sovereignty in Space: Developments 1910 to 1914, in
COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, supra note 40, at 125, 126-36.
4 Id. at 134.
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German territory by French military aviators. Several of these
have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the
territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings
near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one
has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and
Nuremberg.49
After World War I, the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace
Conference in Paris met to examine fundamental principles for
air navigation.5 0 The Commission consisted of delegates from
many European states as well as Japan, Cuba, Brazil, and the
United States.5 1 The Commission drafted the Convention Relat-
ing to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, known as the Paris
Convention. 52 Article 1 of the Convention recognized the exclu-
sive sovereignty of all states over the air space above their terri-
tory, including above territorial waters.53 The Paris Convention
did not define the term "air space."54 After the Paris Conven-
tion entered into force, an annex was adopted which defined
aircraft as "all machines which can derive support in the atmos-
phere from reactions of the air."5 5 However, according to Pro-
fessor Cooper, this did not limit a state's vertical sovereignty
because "the Paris Convention is not to be construed as mean-
ing that in international law States have territorial rights only in
this airspace. The airspace was accepted as part of State terri-
tory but no international determination was made as to the re-
gions of space above.""
49 Id.
50 SeeJohn Cobb Cooper, U.S. Participation in Drafting Paris Convention 1919, 18
J. AIR L. & COM. 266 (1951), reprinted in COOPER, ExPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE
LAw, supra note 25, at 137, 140.
51 Id.
52 See generally Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
53 See id. art. 1.
The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its
territory.
For the purpose of the present Convention, the territory of a
State shall be understood as including the national territory, both
that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial
waters adjacent thereto.
Id.
54 See Cooper, High Altitude Flight, supra note 32, at 259.
55 Id. (quoting from the annex).
56 Id.
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The Paris Convention did not provide for a right of innocent
passage, but it did encourage states to allow innocent passage,
saying "[e]ach contracting State undertakes in time of peace to
accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the
aircraft of the other contracting States."5 However, apparently
the idea of innocent passage was not looked upon favorably; ar-
ticle 15, which provided in part that "every aircraft of a con-
tracting State has the right to cross the air space of another State
without landing," was amended in 1929 to make this right condi-
tional.58 The new paragraph 4 of article 15 said that "[e]very
contracting State may make conditional on its prior authoriza-
tion the establishment of international airways and the creation
and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with
or without landing, on its territory. 59
The right of innocent passage "provided for by Article 2 [was]
thus largely limited to civil aircraft used for pleasure or occa-
sional commercial flights." 60 The Paris Convention was ratified
by most European states and "its statement of airspace sover-
eignty became an accepted part of international law."'"
In 1928 the United States helped draft the Pan American
Convention on Commercial Aviation,62 known as the Havana
Convention, which repeated the Paris Convention's recognition
of complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over airspace
above its territory.63 The Havana Convention also provided a
similarly limited right of innocent passage,64 and "[f] or the op-
eration of scheduled international air services, under the Ha-
vana Convention, just as in the case of the Paris Convention, a
prior consent was required by the states on the route."65
57 Paris Convention, supra note 52, art. 2.
58 See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 20.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 John Cobb Cooper, Airspace Rights over the Arctic [hereinafter Cooper, Air-
space Rights over the Arctic], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra
note 25, at 171, 175.
62 See generally Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation, Feb. 20,
1928, 47 Stat. 1901, 129 L.N.T.S. 225.
63 "The high contracting parties recognize that every state has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory and territorial waters."
Id. art. 1.
64 Id. art. 4 ("Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace to accord
freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the private aircraft of the other
contracting states, provided that the conditions laid down in the present conven-
tion are observed.").
65 McDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 263.
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On September 11, 1944, the United States invited its allies
and neutral states "to participate in an international civil avia-
tion conference."66 Although the U.S.S.R. was invited to attend,
and its delegates were en route to attend the conference, they
were recalled before arriving without explanation.6 7 The "con-
ference met in Chicago, Illinois, from November 1 to December
7, 1944. "68 The United States and many people from other
states hoped that the convention would negotiate a treaty that
would reverse the precedent of the Paris Convention and pro-
vide freedom of navigation.6 9 Instead, the resulting treaty, the
Convention on International Civil Aviation,70 known as the Chi-
cago Convention, reaffirms in article 1 that all states have "com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above [their]
territory."'7' There are currently 188 States that are parties to
the Chicago Convention.72 Professor Cooper, who attended the
1944 Chicago Conference as adviser to the U.S. delegation and
served 'as chairman of one of the two drafting committees, wrote
that he "reported out the present article 1 which had been
adapted from the Paris Convention [and on] behalf of the draft-
ing committee, he recommended its adoption. ' 73 The Chicago
Convention includes the area above a state's territorial waters in
that state's territorial airspace.7 ' The Convention does not pro-
vide any right of innocent passage, 75 and scheduled interna-
tional air services are only allowed with special permission of the
contracting states.7 6
66 Cooper, A Study, supra note 31, at 237.
67 See John Cobb Cooper, The Chicago Convention-After Twenty Years, 19 U.
MIAMI L. Rv. 333 (1965), in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra
note 40, at 439, 440. The U.S.S.R. became a party to the Chicago Convention on
October 15, 1970. See International Civil Aviation Organization, Status of Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation Signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944, http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/chicago.htm (last visited June 9, 2005) [hereinafter
Status of Chicago Convention].
- See Cooper, A Study, supra note 31, at 237.
69 See McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 264-65.
70 Chicago Convention, supra note 23.
71 See id. art. 1.
72 See Status of Chicago Convention, supra note 67.
73 John Cobb Cooper, Air Law-A Field for International Thinking, 4 U.N.
TRANSP. & COMM. R. 1 (1951), in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, supra
note 25, at 1, 8.
74 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, art. 2.
75 "In order that there would be no more uncertainty as to the exact meaning
of the term 'innocent passage,' it was altogether omitted from the Convention."
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 265.
76 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, art. 6.
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Like the Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention does not
define the term "airspace" or its upper limit. According to Pro-
fessor Cooper:
I can tell you as a matter of unwritten history that the effect, if
any, of the [German] V-2 [rocket] on the legal conclusion appli-
cable to flight was not put forward, nor discussed at Chicago....
Article I of the Chicago Convention dealing with air space sover-
eignty was modeled on the Paris Convention. It did not take into
consideration the fact that there had been a few rocket flights of
V-2's prior to the time of the drafting of the Chicago
Convention. 77
An annex to the Chicago Convention defines an aircraft as "any
machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against
the earth's surface. '78 Professor Cooper wrote an article in 1956
titled Legal Problems of Upper Space79 in which one of his conclu-
sions was:
The Chicago Convention contains no definition of "airspace" but
it may well be argued that, as it was adapted from the Paris Con-
vention, it deals with no areas of space other than those parts of
the atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense to sup-
port balloons and airplanes. 80
Therefore, it could be argued that the international recognition
of absolute state sovereignty of airspace expressed in article 1 of
the Chicago Convention only extends up to the point where
flight by conventional aircraft and balloons is possible. How-
ever, as Loftus Becker, the legal advisor to the Secretary of
State,8' wrote in 1959,
Even if such international agreements as the Chicago Conven-
tion of 1944 be interpreted as conferring "complete and exclu-
77 G. Vernon Leopold & Allison L. Scafuri, Orbital and Super-Orbital Space Flight
Trajectories, 36 U. DET. L.J. 515, 518 n.15 (1959). The German V-2 rocket climbed
to an altitude of 60 miles (96.5 kilometers) on its way to its target. See McDouGAL
ET AL., supra note 33, at 201.
78 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY AND
REGISTRATION MARKS, ANNEX 7 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVi-
ATION § 1 (4th ed. 1981). Balloons are considered to be aircraft as well. See id.
79 John Cobb Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space [hereinafter Cooper, Upper
Space], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, supra note 25, at 268.
80 Id. at 272.
81 Loftus Becker was the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State fromJune 1957
until August 1959. See U.S. Dep't of State, Legal Advisors, http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ho/po/12106.htm (last visited June 9, 2005).
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sive" sovereignty only within some limit of "air space"-a concept
not defined either in the Convention, by lawyers, or by scien-
tists-it should be noted that this does not of itself establish that
the United States has no rights above these limits.1 2
Professor Cooper earlier reached the same conclusion in 1951,
writing that" [t] he territory of the State extends upward at least as
far above the surface as to include a region which can be
roughly defined as 'airspace.'
Today, access to a foreign state's airspace by aircraft for inter-
national commerce can be obtained only through bilateral or
multilateral agreement. 84 There are now many thousand indi-
vidual bilateral and multilateral agreements in force, which are
necessary for airlines to operate international air service. These
are negotiated by states and cumulatively represent a great ex-
penditure of time, energy, and treasure that could have been
more productively used in other areas.
B. COMPARISON TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA
The problem of defining a state's vertical sovereignty is funda-
mentally based on the lack of a natural boundary separating air
and space. This is similar to the lack of natural boundaries sepa-
rating "international waters" from a state's "territorial waters."
Coastal states historically have made claims to waters adjacent to
their territory, called the "territorial sea." The width of states'
claims to territorial seas has varied greatly. At least three rea-
sons have been given to justify these claims: state security; cus-
toms and commercial supervision of ships; and coastal state's
welfare being dependent upon its exclusive enjoyment of the
products of the sea in its territorial waters.85 The early claims by
states to territorial seas of three nautical miles (nm) (3.5 miles
or 5.5 kilometers) apparently were based on the maximum
range of naval cannons.86 The United States has always claimed
82 Loftus Becker, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Development of Law for Outer Space,
JAGJ., Feb. 1959, at 4, 7 [hereinafter Becker, U.S. Foreign Policy].
83 Cooper, High Altitude Flight, supra note 32, at 260.
84 See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 268.
85 SeeJOHN TAYLOR MURCHISON, THE CONTIGUOUS AIR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 25 (1956).
86 Id. at 26.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
only a limited territorial sea, adopting a three-mile territorial sea
in 1793.87
In the eighteenth century, the United Kingdom expanded its
claimed territorial sea to combat smuggling.88 A 1736 Act of
Parliament extended jurisdiction to four leagues.89 As the
smugglers adapted to each new claim, the U.K. responded by
increasing its claims further.9" In 1794, jurisdiction was ex-
tended in some cases up to fifty miles (80 kilometers), and in
1805 it was extended in some cases up to 100 leagues (300 miles
or 480 kilometers).9 1 Interestingly, throughout this period
there is no record of any other state objecting to this infringe-
ment on their rights of navigation.9 2 Finally, in the late nine-
teenth century, the U.K. consolidated all of its customs laws and
decreased its territorial sea claims to between one and four
leagues.9 3
In the twentieth century, states claimed territorial seas of vary-
ing widths. However, according to Mr. Becker, "by the latter
part of the 19th century or the early part of the 20th century,
the 3-mile limit was firmly established as customary international
law."9 In 1958, three conventions were drafted in Geneva codi-
fying various aspects of the law of the sea.9 5 Unfortunately,
these conventions did not specify the maximum width of the
territorial sea that states could claim.96 States continued to
claim varying widths for their territorial seas, and some even
claimed up to 100 nm (115 miles or 185 kilometers).
87 Loftus Becker, Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser, Address Before
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1958), in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL.
832, 834 (1958) [hereinafter Becker, Political Problems].
88 See MURCHISON, supra note 85, at 29.
89 See id. at 31.
90 See id. at 32.
91 See id. at 32-33.
92 See id. at 33.
93 See id. Note that a marine league equals three miles.
94 Becker, Political Problems, supra note 87, at 834. See also NIJEHOLT, supra
note 37, at 18 (asserting that three miles is "the generally adopted breadth of the
territorial waters.").
95 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
96 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 95,
arts. 1-2; John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Opera-
tions, 42 A.F. L. REv. 119, 121 (1997).
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The United Nations sponsored several conferences between
1973 and 1982 to update the 1958 conventions.9 7 These confer-
ences led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, known as the Law of the Sea Convention, which entered
into force in 1994.98 The Law of the Sea Convention specifies
that states may claim no more than 12 nm (13.8 miles or 22.2
kilometers) for their territorial seas.99 A state's sovereignty ex-
tends to the air space above the territorial sea,'0 0 so its territorial
airspace does not begin at the coast. The Law of the Sea Con-
vention also allows states to make territorial claims to "historic"
bays.1"' To qualify as a historic bay, a State must have exercised
continuous and open authority over the bay and the authority
must be acquiesced to by other states. 1 2 In 1997, fifteen states
made claims to historic bays. 10 3 The Convention recognizes a
right of innocent passage for all ships through the territorial
seas of coastal states. 104 The Convention does not require any
prior notice or authorization before exercising the right of inno-
cent passage.' 0 5 The Convention grants all ships and aircraft a
right of transit passage through a strait from one part of the
high seas (or an economic exclusive zone (EEZ)) to another
part of the high seas (or EEZ).' 0 6
The mere existence of a law does not mean it will be followed
or uniformly interpreted. Even after the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion entered into force, problems still arise over varying claims
by states to territorial waters. In 1999, nine states claimed terri-
torial seas extending beyond 12 nm,'0 7 and Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, Liberia, and Sierra Leone claimed 200 nm (230 miles or
97 Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 121.
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1245, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (becoming effective on Nov. 16, 1994)
[hereinafter the Law of the Sea Convention].
99 Id. art. 3.
100 See id. art. 2(2); Chicago Convention, supra note 23, art. 2.
10, Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 98, art. 10(6).
102 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 18.
103 See Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 126.
104 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 98, arts. 17-26.
105 See id.
106 See id. arts. 37-45.
107 The Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-
General, 86, U.N. Doc. A/54/429 (Sept. 30, 1999)(hereinafter Oceans and the
Law of the Sea).
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370 kilometers) wide territorial seas. 10 8 Also, the maximum 12
nm width of each state's territorial sea is measured from base-
lines that are somewhat difficult to determine. 109 Regarding the
right of innocent passage, over twenty-five states require prior
permission before exercising the right, and thirteen require
prior notification.' However, overall compliance of states with
the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions on the establishment
of the outer limits of territorial seas is considered to be "very
high."111
The various interpretations of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion's provisions can lead to conflict.1 2 The United States does
not recognize any claims to historic bays or claims to territorial
seas beyond 12 nm.l1 It demonstrates its lack of recognition of
excessive maritime claims by conducting a freedom of naviga-
tion program."' This is done by sending U.S. Navy and Coast
Guard ships into the contested waters.1 15 These actions prevent
excessive territorial claims of States from becoming accepted as
international norms. 16 The freedom of navigation operations
have "oftentimes have persuaded States to bring their practices
into conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea."' 17
Before the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force, U.S.
President Ronald Reagan expanded the U.S. territorial sea to 12
nm, 11 8 although the United States has not ratified the Law of the
Sea Convention. I
108 WILLIAM S. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE CONGRESS app. H (2000) [hereinafter COHEN, 2000 REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2000/.
-o See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 98, arts. 3-15.
110 Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 132.
111 Oceans and the Law of the Sea, supra note 107, 85.
112 See infra notes 431-449 and accompanying text.
113 Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 126.
114 See COHEN, 2000 REPORT, supra note 108, app. H. The most widely known
United States freedom of navigation operation involved U.S. Navy operations in
the Gulf of Sidra off of the coast of Libya in the 1980s. See GRIEF, supra note 30, at
18.
115 See Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 126.
116 WILLIAM S. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE CONGRESS app. H (2001) [hereinafter COHEN, 2001 REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2001/index.html.
117 Id. Like the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force conducts a freedom of navigation
program in the air. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Military Operations Other
Than War, July 3, 2000, at 18, available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
pubfiles/afdc/dd/afdd2-3/afdd2-3pdf.
118 See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
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The U.S.S.R. is a good example of a state that has repeatedly
made maritime claims that do not comport with international
law. 1 9 In 1927, the U.S.S.R. established an official territorial sea
of 12 nm.12° Although by 1961 the U.S.S.R. had ratified three of
the four Law of the Sea Conventions, "[t]he Soviet Union main-
tain [ed] that nothing in international law require [d] a nation to
adhere to a particular width of territorial sea belt or to use any
particular method of measurement of the base line from which
a territorial belt extends seaward." 121 The U.S.S.R. abused three
concepts of international law to unilaterally annex "over three
million square kilometers of the high seas" between 1931 and
1961.122 For example, in 1957 the U.S.S.R. declared the "Bay of
Peter the Great" near Vladivostok to be a historic bay and said
no foreign ships would be allowed to enter. 23 According to Mr.
William Harben, a U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Of-
ficer, 124 "[t] he 'Bay' of Peter the Great is a rather shallow inden-
tation and does not meet the 'semicircle' definitional test.' 125
The United States protested this declaration in a series of diplo-
matic notes, concluding in one that the United States "reserves
its right to take such action as it deems necessary to protect each
and all of its right in that area." 126
C. STATE POSITIONS CONCERNING VERTICAL SOVEREIGNTY
In the years since the drafting of the Chicago Convention,
states have taken different positions on the extent of vertical sov-
ereignty and definitions of their national airspace. There is no
consensus today.
Australia
In 2002, Australia began reforming its National Airspace Sys-
tem (NAS) based on international standards as applied in the
United States, but with a defined upper limit of 60,000 feet
119 See William N. Harben, Soviet Attitudes and Practices Concerning Maritime Wa-
ters, 15JAGJ. 149, 153-154 (1961).
120 Id. at 149.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 150. The article of Mr. Harben includes a map showing all of the
maritime claims of the U.S.S.R. See id. at 151.
123 See id. at 152.
124 See id. at 149.
125 See id. at 152.
126 See U.S. Note to U.S.S.R. (Mar. 6, 1958), reprinted in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 461
(1958).
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(18.3 kilometers) for Class A airspace. 127 For space launch li-
censing purposes, Australia's Space Activities Act of 1998 defines
a space object as a payload carried to or back from "an area
beyond the distance of 100 kilometers above mean sea level."'128
These acts do not mean, however, that Australia is renouncing
any claims of sovereignty it may have to the area above 60,000
feet or even above 100 kilometers (62 miles).
The Federal Republic of Germany
In 1961, Germany amended its Law Concerning Air Naviga-
tion of January 10, 1959, to include spacecraft and rockets in its
definition of "aircraft.' 1 29 The law does not define the upper
extent of this airspace.°
The Russian Federation and the U.S.S.R.
Prior to the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, U.S.S.R.
attorneys asserted that the sovereignty of a state extended to un-
limited height.131 After Sputnik, U.S.S.R. authors rejected the
prior Soviet writings and argued that no state could claim sover-
eignty in space.1 12 Responding to unofficial claims that Sputnik
had violated the territory of other states, Dr. G. Zadorozhni, a
Soviet lawyer, wrote that Sputnik did not "penetrate the air
space over any territories; rather it is these territories which run
127 See Stephen Angus, National Airspace System Implementation Group Concept (Ver-
sion 5.0), available at http://www.dotars.gov.au/aviation/airspace-reform/doc/
nas.concept.doc. See also National Airspace System Implementation Group, Air-
spacefor Eveyone, AIRSPACE ADVISER No. 1.1 (Oct. 2003) 16, 18, available at http://
www.dotars.gov.au/airspace-reform/pdf/airspace.pdf.
128 Space Activities Act, 1998, § 8 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.
au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl .nsf/0/9ACAE6DB9C35F901CA256F
7100526E2D/$file/SpaceAct98.pdf.
129 See Law Amending the Law Concerning Air Navigation (6th Amendment),
art. 1 (b),Jul. 25, 1964, reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, 89TH CONG.,
1 AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 777 (Comm. Print 1965). The amended
article 1(2) provided, "Aircraft shall be deemed airplanes, helicopters, dirigibles,
glider planes, free and captive balloons, kites, flight models and other instrumen-
talities intended for the use of the airspace, in particular spacecraft, rockets and
similar flight instrumentalities."
130 Id.
131 McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 234-35. However, a widely cited article
on this subject by two U.S.S.R. authors must be considered in light of the fact that
it was written in direct response to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' argument [see
infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text] that U.S. balloon flights over the
U.S.S.R. did not violate its sovereignty. See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 33, at
235 n.120.
132 See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 235.
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under . . . the orbit of the satellite's movement."'' 33 But the




South Africa's laws apparently leave a gap between the areas
defined as airspace and outer-space.'35 Its aviation act mirrors
the definition in annex 7 to the Chicago Convention, 136 appar-
ently limiting its territorial airspace to the maximum height at
which aircraft can "derive support from the atmosphere."'137
However, a separate law defines "outer space" as "the space
above the surface of the earth from a height at which it is in
practice possible to operate an object in an orbit around the
earth."138
The United Kingdom
During an October 1999 session of the U.K. House of Lords,
Lord Macdonald of Tradeston (then the Minister of State, De-
partment of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions) said
that "the UK does not have a working definition of the upper
limit of UK airspace, but for practical purposes the limit is con-
133 200th Circuit By Satellite To-Day, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1957, at 7 (trans-
lating an article in the newspaper Soviet Russia); Leopold & Scafuri, supra note
77, at 528 (also quoting Dr. Zadorozhni).
134 According to the Air Code of Dec. 29, 1961,
The complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of the
U.S.S.R. shall belong to the U.S.S.R.
Airspace of the U.S.S.R. shall be deemed to be the airspace above
the land and water territory of the U.S.S.R. including the space
above the territorial waters as determined by the laws of the
U.S.S.R. and by international treaties concluded by the U.S.S.R.
Air Code, Dec. 29, 1961, art. 1 (U.S.S.R.), reprinted in STAFF or S. COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, 89TH CONG., 2 AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 2545 (Comm. Print
1965).
135 See South Africa Department of Transportation, White Paper on National Policy on
Airports and Airspace Management (1997), available at http://www.transport.gov.za/
library/docs/white-paper/airport-wp.html.
136 See INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY
AND REGISTRATION MARKS, ANNEX 7 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION § 1 (4th ed. 1981).
137 See South Africa Department of Transportation, supra note 135 (citing the Avia-
tion Act 74 of 1962 (S. Africa)).
138 Space Affairs Act, 84 of 1993 art. 1 (S. Africa), available at http://www.oosa.
unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/national/southafrica/spaceaffairs act 1993E.html.
84 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE [72
sidered to be at least as high as any aircraft can fly."' 139 So al-
though the U.K. has apparently set no upper limit to its
sovereignty, it also is not limiting any future claims it may
assert. 14
The United States
Although the United States agreed with the principle of air-
space sovereignty expressed in the Paris Convention, the United
States signed it but did not ratify it. 14 1 In the Air Commerce Act
of 1926, the United States claimed "complete sovereignty of the
airspace over the lands and waters of the United States.114 2 The
United States ratified the Havana Convention in 193114 ' and the
Chicago Convention in 1946.144
The United States' position on the vertical extent of state sov-
ereignty changed repeatedly in the 1950s and 60s. In 1956, dur-
ing a news conference discussing U.S.S.R. protests of U.S. high-
altitude balloons violating U.S.S.R. airspace, U.S. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles said "the question of the ownership of
upper air is a disputable question.... What the legal position is,
I wouldn't feel in a position to answer because I do not believe
that the legal position has even been codified ....",5 Later in
the same news conference, Secretary Dulles answered a question




141 See Cooper, Airspace Rights over the Arctic, supra note 61, at 175.
142 See An Act To Encourage and Regulate the Use of Aircraft in Commerce,
and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 69-254, § 6, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(a), 72 Stat. 731, 806 (1958).
143 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 698 (1969). The United States
renounced the Havana Convention in 1947 after ratifying the Chicago Conven-
tion. See id.
144 See generally Status of Chicago Convention, supra note 67.
145 Transcript of the Record of News Conference Held by Dulles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1956, at 10. Although the quote above appears to be a definitive statement, Sec-
retary Dulles qualified it by arguing that the balloons were not interfering with
aircraft rather than discussing sovereignty, saying that there is a "recognized prac-
tice to avoid putting up into the air anything which could interfere with any nor-
mal use of the air by anybody else." Id. The next day Secretary Dulles said the
United States' position was that "the legal status of the upper air and the spaces
beyond it [was] still undetermined, and that recognition of any national claim
there might raise questions as to the legality of other modern media, such as
radio waves and even the projected space satellite." The Balloon Controversy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1956, at 30.
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by saying, "Yes, I think that we feel [that the United States has
the right to send balloons at a certain height anywhere around
the globe], although .. .there is no clear international law on
the subject."" 6 Secretary Dulles was asked the approximate
height at which a balloon leaves the area of sovereignty, and he
responded:
I just can't answer that question. I am very sorry. But it is the
same problem that we get on a minor scale when you deal with a
question as to whether a man who has a house near an airfield
has a right to prevent planes flying over his piece of land and his
home.... [A] ithough certainly everybody admits that if you own
a piece of land, you do control the air a certain distance up. But
precisely what the distance is has never been decided, even in
domestic law. When you get into international law, the problem
is also obscure. I don't know how high a balloon has to go
before you get out of the bounds of sovereignty, so to speak.147
Shortly after Sputnik's launch, several U.S. Air Force staff of-
ficers thought the United States should protest Sputnik's orbit
over the country as a violation of sovereignty, but the United
States did not file a protest. 148 In May 1958, Mr. Becker, al-
though careful to say he was not taking a position, suggested to
Congress that state sovereignty might extend up to 10,000
miles. 149 In 1962, U.S. Air Force Major General John M. Reyn-
olds, the Vice-Director of the Joint Staff, expressed the U.S. De-
146 Transcript of the Record of News Conference Held by Dulles, supra note 145, at 10.
147 Id.
148 See DELBERT R. TERRILL, JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNA-
TIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW 27 (1999), available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/
aul/aupress/Books/Terrill/terrill.pdf. Ultimately, the U.S. Air Force did not
urge the U.S. State Department to protest because the U.S.S.R.'s orbiting of Sput-
nik helped to establish a legal norm of freedom of outer space. See id.
149 See Loftus Becker, Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space, Address
Before the Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics (May 14, 1958),
in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 962, 966 (1958) [hereinafter Becker, Problem of Outer
Space].
I think it important to note, however, that one of the suggestions
that has been made in this regard is that the airspace should be
defined to include that portion of space above the earth in which
there is any atmosphere. I am informed that astronomically the
earth's atmosphere extends 10,000 miles above its surface.
It follows that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain that
under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the U.S. extends
10,000 miles from the surface of the earth, an area which would
comprehend the area in which all of the satellites up to this point
have entered.
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partment of Defense's position on an international agreement
on a boundary between air and space as being "neither neces-
sary nor desirable at this time. Should a finite boundary be
forced upon us, 20 miles or less would be least disadvanta-
geous."15 At some point in the 1960s, the U.S. State Depart-
ment proposed encouraging an international agreement
defining outer space, but the U.S. Air Force convinced the U.S.
Department of Defense to resist this idea, and apparently the
U.S. State Department never proceeded. 5 1
After examining U.S. laws, Professor Cooper concluded in
1965 that the United States claimed "complete, absolute and ex-
clusive jurisdiction to control all types of flight in its territorial
airspace zone" but that the United States had not specified the
upper boundary of its sovereign airspace zone. 1 2 The United
States currently claims "exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the
United States," and the term "airspace" is not further defined.153
In the subsection defining the "use of airspace," use is linked to
"aircraft."' 54 But the term "aircraft" is broadly defined as "any
contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in,
the air.' 55 This definition is broad enough to include rockets
and other high altitude vehicles that do not rely on aerodynamic
lift to ",fly."156 In various sections of the U.S. Code, the term
"outer space" is used in the definition of other terms but is not
itself specifically defined. 157
In 2001, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Of-
fice of Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transpor-
tation (CST) published a concept of operations for commercial
space transportation in the U.S. National Air Space System
(NAS). 158 It was designed "in anticipation of the evolution of a
150 TERRILL, supra note 148, at 53.
151 See id. at 54.
152 John Cobb Cooper, Contiguous Zones in Aerospace-Preventive and Protective Ju-
risdiction, 7 A.F. L. REv. 15 (1965) [hereinafter Cooper, Contiguous Zones], re-
printed in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra note 25, at 316,
319-20. See also Becker, Problem of Outer Space, supra note 149, at 966 ("The
U.S. Government has not recognized any top or upper limit to its sovereignty.").
153 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (1) (2006).
154 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2006).
155 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (6) (2006).
156 See id.
157 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 5802 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 14701 (2006); 49 U.S.C.
§§ 70101, 70102 (2006).
158 OFFICE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTA-
TION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMER-
CIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM VERSION 2.0
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NAS environment in the 21st century that fully integrates com-
mercial space operations."' 59 It notes that "[h]istorically, com-
mercial launch operations have occurred at coastal federal
ranges utilizing only ELVs [expendable launch vehicles]. As a
result, these space operations have had minimal impact on NAS
operations due to their infrequent occurrence and offshore tra-
jectories."'6 ° However, in the future,
[c] hanges in the magnitude and complexity of space operations
will place new demands on the NAS as vehicles in route to and
from earth orbit and beyond transition through airspace that is
currently the near exclusive domain of aviation traffic.... [T] he
expected increase in frequency of commercial launches and re-
entries, from a broad range of locations, in the U.S. will contrib-
ute substantially to competition for airspace amongst NAS users.
Therefore, the FAA must now consider a 'Space and Air Traffic
Management System' (SATMS) that equitably supports both the
evolving commercial space transportation industry and the ma-
ture and continuously growing aviation industry in a systematic,
integrated manner. Thus, the SATMS represents an evolutionary
expansion of the U.S. air traffic management system to encom-
pass the people, infrastructure, policies, procedures, rules, and
regulations necessary to fully integrate space and aviation opera-
tions under a single infrastructure.1 6
One part of the plan anticipates an eventual ceiling on the
U.S. NAS.' 6 2 This would be done to "demarcate the FAA's oper-
ational responsibilities."' 6 3 No agency is specified to handle traf-
fic control above the NAS, and the space vehicle operator is
responsible for safety of navigation.'64 Although the FAA is con-
sidering defining an upper limit to the U.S. NAS, this limit
(2001), available at http://faa.gov/airports-airtraffic/air-traffic/satms/media/
conops-narrativeyv2.pdf.
159 Id. § 1.
I6o Id. § 1.1.
16, Id.
162 See id. § 2.3. An earlier version of this concept of operations anticipated
setting a vertical limit on the U.S. NAS by 2005. See OrcE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINIS-
TRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRA-
TION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION IN THE
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM IN 2005 § 2.3 (1999), available at http://
www.spacefuture.com/archive/
conceptof operations in-the-national-airspace-system-in_2005.shtml.
163 OFFICE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTA-
TION, supra note 162, § 2.3.
164 See id. § 2.3 n.3.
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would not preclude the United States from continuing to claim
sovereignty above that point.
Interestingly, for at least the limited purpose of defining the
qualifications of an astronaut, the U.S. Air Force defines "space"
as the area 50 miles (80.4 kilometers) above the Earth's surface
in a 2003 regulation. 6
5
III. CHAPTER II: NEED FOR DEFINITION
A. TECHNOLOGIES DRIVING DELINEATION
As early as the 1960s, there were many proposals for "space
planes."' 66 These' created potential legal issues that were not yet
resolved by international law. However, only one of these, the
U.S. Space Shuttle, is actually operational, and therefore, many
of the potential legal issues never materialized. Elizabeth Kelly
provides a detailed review of space plane experiments and
proposals. 167
The current ideas for vehicles operating in near space are
more diverse than a pure space plane. They include relatively
low-cost suborbital vehicles capable of providing short flights for
tourists, vehicles operating at high altitude with intercontinental
ranges, and autonomous long-endurance high altitude vehicles
used to conduct surveillance or as communications platforms.
Some of these vehicles have moved beyond paper and have
demonstrated their capabilities.
Space Tourism
On October 4, 2004, on the 47th anniversary of the launch of
Sputnik, SpaceShipOne, a private vehicle designed in the
United States, won the Ansari X-Prize after ascending to 367,463
feet (69.6 miles or 112 kilometers). 168 This is 13,000 feet higher
than the previous "unofficial" record set by NASA's X-15 pro-
165 See Air Force Instruction 11-402, Aviation and Parachutist Service, Aeronauti-
cal Ratings and Badges, July 29, 2003, para. 2.3.2, available at http://www.e-pub-
lishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/ 11 /afil 1-402/afil 1-402.pdf.
166 See Elizabeth Kelly, The Spaceplane: The Catalyst for Resolution of the
Boundary and "Space Object" Issues in the Law of Outer Space? 7-28 (1998)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University (Montreal)) (on file with the Mc-
Gill University Nahum Gelber Law Library).
167 Id.
168 Michael A. Dornheim, SpaceShipWon: FAA Administrator Hints Spaceships May
Be Treated Like Experimental Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 11, 2004, at 34
[hereinafter Dornheim, SpaceShip Wonl.
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gram.' 69 During the flight, SpaceShipOne accelerated to Mach
3.09 on ascent and Mach 3.26 during descent. 170 Although the
vehicle reached a high altitude and supersonic speed, SpaceShi-
pOne was not designed for long distance travel: it descends al-
most vertically, traveling no more than 3 miles (4.8 kilometers)
horizontally. 7 1 A short video of a flight of SpaceShipOne is
available on the internet.1
72
SpaceShipOne was designed and constructed by Burt Rutan
and his company, Scaled Composites. 73  SpaceShipOne is
dropped from a special carrier aircraft, called White Knight,
also designed by Scaled Composites. 174 This allows SpaceShi-
pOne to save weight by only carrying enough fuel to power it
through the less dense layers of the atmosphere. 75  White
Knight released SpaceShipOne at 47,000 feet (14.3 kilome-
ters) .176 The entire program cost approximately $25 million. 177
Although SpaceShipOne was designed specifically to the re-
quirements of the X-Prize 178 and only had seats for three peo-
ple, Virgin Galactic recently invested $100 million to develop a
larger version of the vehicle capable of carrying five passengers
169 Id. The maximum altitude obtained by an X-15 was 354,200 feet (67.1
miles, or 108 kilometers). Kelly, supra note 166, at 8.
170 Dornheim, SpaceShipWon, supra note 168.
171 Michael A. Dornheim, Affordable Spaceship, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21,
2003, at 64.
172 See The Discovery Channel, The Race for Space http://media.dsc.discovery.
com/convergence/raceforspace/videogallery/videoplayer2.html (last visited
May 25, 2005).
173 See Dornheim, SpaceShipWon, supra note 168.
174 Id.
175 See WILUAM L. SPACy II, DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED SPACE-BASED WEAP-
ONS? 79 & n.18 (1999). See also Robert Zubrin & Mitchell Burnside Clapp, Avia-
tion's Next Great Leap: Rocket-Powered Aircraft that Can Travel at Hypersonic Speeds,
TECH. REv., Jan. 11, 1998, at 30.
Space launch vehicles are typically staged to reduce overhead
costs .... [M]ost of the size of a space launch vehicle is set by fuel
needs, which are enormous for any launch vehicle. Once the fuel is
exhausted, there's no need to drag along the big empty tanks to
orbit, so a space launch vehicle stacks several rockets on top of one
another. Each rocket stage falls away when it burns out, reducing
the structure that is carried into space.
Simon P. Worden & John E. Shaw, Whither Space Power? Forging a Strategy for
the New Century 76 (2002), available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/
aupress/catalog/fairchild-papers/WordenShawP26.htm.
176 Dornheim, SpaceShipWon, supra note 168.
177 Id.
178 "X Prize rules require that the craft carry 270 kilograms (595 pounds) of
payload, including the pilot." Id.
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and crew for commercial space flights. 17 9 The Mojave Airport in
Palmdale, California, the launch site for SpaceShipOne, has
been licensed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to be
a space launch facility. 8 ' The successful flights of SpaceShi-
pOne have helped to lower the threshold of space, at least to the
public-many people now think that space begins at an altitude
of 62 miles (100 kilometers).' 8' Many legal scholars would also
agree that this altitude is above the vertical limit of a state's sov-
ereign air space.1 1 2 Although SpaceShipOne is probably the
most publicly-known commercial space tourist application, sev-
eral other companies are also trying to develop vehicles for
space tourism.IS1
HyperSoar
HyperSoar is a concept developed by the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.8 4 It would be powered by rocket-based
combined-cycle (RBCC) engines, 1 5 one component of which is
a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet).lI6 It would take off
179 Michael A. Dornheim, Sir Space Tourist; Virgin Galactic Eyes Follow-on Genera-
tion Going to Orbit and Around the Moon, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 2004, at
30.
180 OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINIS-
TRATION, 2005 U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS AND CON-
CEPTS: VEHICLES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND SPACEPORTS 37 (2005), available at http://
ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/2005_dev_con.pdf; Alan Boyle, Amazon Founder Unveils Space
Center Plans, MSNBC.coM, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
6822763/.
181 See Peter Pae, Rocket Takes 1st Prize of a New Space Race, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2004, at Al (noting SpaceShipOne climbed "well past the 62-mile-high boundary
that is widely considered the frontier between the Earth's atmosphere and outer
space").
182 See, e.g., Bin Cheng, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Bound-
ary Problem, V ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 323 (1980) [hereinafter Cheng, The
Boundary Problem], reprinted in BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
425, 451 (1997) [hereinafter CHENG, SPACE LAW]. While not precisely defining
the limit of national sovereignty, Professor Bin Cheng writes that above 68 miles
(110 kilometers), "one is definitely in outer space, according to lex lata." See id.
183 See OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, supra note 180, at
18-22; Max Boot, Commentary, Space, the Final Free Market, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2004, at B13; Boyle, supra note 209.
184 Jefferson Morris, Space Plane "Dream" Still Alive at DARPA, Tether Says, AERO-
SPACE DAILY, Oct. 24, 2003, at 5 [hereinafter Morris, Space Plane].
185 See William B. Scott, Airbreathing HyperSoar Would "Bounce" on Upper Atmos-
phere, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 7, 1998, at 126 [hereafter Scott, HyperSoar].
186 On November 16, 2004, NASA successfully tested the X-43A which was de-
signed to test a scramjet engine. Hypersonic Plane Breaks Speed Record,
MSNBC.coM, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6504898/.
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horizontally from a standard 10,000 foot (3 kilometers) run-
way.'8 7 After accelerating to Mach 10 and climbing to about
130,000 feet (25 miles or 40 kilometers) 88 its engines would be
turned off and it would coast up to an altitude of 40 miles (64
kilometers) or more.189 The vehicle would then descend back
into denser air, to an altitude of around 20 miles (32 kilome-
ters), where aerodynamic lift is possible.190 It would then restart
its engines to start the process over and continue doing this re-
peatedly to "skip" along the upper atmosphere. 9' About 2.5 cy-
cles would cover approximately 620 miles (1000 kilometers) .192
A flight from Chicago to Toyko, approximately 6290 miles
(10,100 kilometers), could be completed in eighteen cycles and
only seventy-two minutes. 1 3
Although the idea behind HyperSoar, also called "periodic hy-
personic cruise," has been around for over forty years,9 4 the de-
1,7 See Scott, HyperSoar, supra note 185.
188 Id.
18.) Christian Lowe & Nathaniel Levine, Corps Has Its Sights Set on Space; Hyper-




192 Scott, HyperSoar, supra note 185.
193 Ann Parker, Bringing Hypersonic Flight down to Earth, Sci. & TECH. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 21, available at http://www.llnl.gov/str/pdfs/01_00.3.pdf.
194 Apparently the idea of skipping along the upper atmosphere has existed
since the dawn of space flight. See Spencer M. Beresford, Surveillance Aircraft and
Satellites: A Problem of International Law, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 107, 109 (1960)
(describing a "skip rocket" that would "alternately descend from outer space into
the atmosphere, and then turn upward into outer space, like a flat stone skipping
over the surface of a pond").
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sign of HyperSoar is unique according to its developer.'95 He
claims "better performance, lower g-loads, efficient heat man-
agement and reduced technical risk. ' 196 Accordingly, this
makes the design more practical than other "transatmospheric"
vehicle concepts, such as "Germany's Sanger, the U.S. X-20B
DynaSoar, X-30 National Aero Space Plane and the Air Force's
Boost Glide Vehicle and military spaceplane."1 97 One problem
avoided by periodic hypersonic cruise is the extreme heat gener-
ated by friction during high-speed flight in the atmosphere.' 98
Heat buildup killed most earlier designs for hypersonic travel.1 99
For example, during NASA's recent test of the X-43A, the test
vehicle flew at approximately 110,000 feet (20.8 miles or 33.5
kilometers) at a maximum speed of Mach 9.6 for only 20
seconds, but it reached a temperature of about 3,000 degrees
Fahrenheit (1650 degrees Celsius) .200 HyperSoar would avoid
this problem because when coasting during its ballistic arcs, it
will be able to radiate most of the heat generated during flight
in the atmosphere into space.2 °1
Research on the HyperSoar concept is being funded by the
U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
under a program called "Force Application and Launch from
the Continental U.S.," or FALCON. 20 2 The FALCON program is
split into two parts: a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV) (a version
of the HyperSoar concept) and the common aero vehicle (CAV)
(an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle capable
of carrying about 1,000 pounds of munitions or other
payload) .20' Although funding was decreased for the CAV por-
tion of the program in 2004,2o4 the first flight of the HCV is
195 See Scott, HyperSoar, supra note 185.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See Parker, supra note 181, at 21.
- See id.
200 See Hypersonic Plane Breaks Speed Record, supra note 186.
201 See Scott, HyperSoar, supra note 185, at 126.
202 Morris, Space Plane, supra note 184, at 5; Defense Watch, DEF. DAILY, Oct. 27,
2003.
203 See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, FORCE APPLICATION AND
LAUNCH FROM CONUS (FALCON) BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 1 (July 29,
2003), available at http://www.darpa.mil/tto/falcon/FALCON PIPFINAL.pdf;
Morris, Space Plane, supra note 202, at 5.
204 Jefferson Morris, Analyst: Space Weapon Proponents Need to Make Better Case,
AEROSPACE DAILY & DEF. REP., Aug. 5, 2004, at 1.
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scheduled for 2009.205 The U.S. Air Force and DARPA awarded
$8.3 million to Lockheed Martin Aeronautics for prototypes for
the six-month second phase of the HCV program.20 6 Lockheed
could receive an additional $97 million during a thirty-month
phase Ilb to complete detailed design, fabrication, and flight-
test of a hypersonic technology test vehicle.2 °7
The U.S. Air Force is preparing an environmental study for a
proposed hypersonic cruise corridor to test a hypersonic vehi-
cle. 2 8 The study examines the environmental impacts associ-
ated with the proposed establishment of flight corridors for
testing an air-launched, hypersonic vehicle that would land at
Edwards Air Force Base in California. 20 9
If HyperSoar, or something like it, works and is available for
commercial transport, it could be highly profitable.
An Aviation Industries Assn. modeling standard predicted a
HyperSoar-type vehicle would generate 10 times the daily reve-
nue of a subsonic aircraft, but would cost twice as much to oper-
ate, primarily due to the handling and consumption of liquid
hydrogen fuel. Theoretically, that would still yield a profit five
times higher than the subsonic alternative, once a mature Hyper-
Soar infrastructure was in place. However, few, if any, commer-
cial firms could afford the necessary development costs,
proponents admitted.210
However, past predictions about operational costs in this realm
have proven unreliable: the cost per launch of the space shuttle
was expected to be $10 - $12 million but is now more than $450
million. 1 Mission turnaround time for the space shuttle was
expected to be a few days but is now a few months.212
205 See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, supra note 232, at 6 fig.
2.1; Morris, Space Plane, supra note 184, at 5.
206 See Press Release, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA and
Air Force Award Falcon Phase II Task 2 Effort (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://
www.darpa.mil/body/news/2004/pdf/falcon-ph2-t2.pdf.
207 See id.
208 See Christopher Smith, Secret Dugway Role May Expand, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan.
18, 2005.
209 AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CTR., U.S. AIR FORCE, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT FOR HYPERSONIC CORRIDORS AT EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE 1 (Nov. 2004) (on
file with author). The environmental assessment is being extensively redrafted
based on comments received. Email from Larry Hagenauer, TYBRIN Corpora-
tion, to Dean Reinhardt, U.S. Air Force (Feb. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
210 Scott, HyperSoar, supra note 185.
211 See Boot, supra note 183.
212 See id.
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Other High-Altitude Vehicles
Balloons provided the first means of human air travel. They
also were an early driving force behind the development of air
law. In World War I, rigid airships called zeppelins which could
travel at what was then considered to be high altitude were used
by Germany to launch attacks on the United Kingdom. 213
During World War II, Japan demonstrated a surprisingly ad-
vanced understanding of the jet stream by launching balloons
against the U.S. mainland.214 The balloons were constructed of
mulberry paper and had barometers to sense their altitude and
trigger the release of ballast when the balloons dropped below
the proper altitude during their drift to the United States.215
Traveling between 30,000 and 35,000 feet (9.1 and 10.7 kilome-
ters), the balloons could cross the Pacific Ocean and reach
North America in about seventy hours. 216 They carried relatively
small incendiary bombs and high explosive bombs and were ex-
pected to start forest fires and cause fear in the United States.21 7
More than 9,000 of the balloons were released, and six people
in the United States were killed by them.218
In the 1950s, the U.S. military had several programs that
worked on manned high-altitude balloons. 219 These were used
to gain knowledge of the affects of high-altitude flight on
humans, information that proved very valuable for manned
space flight.220
213 See U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, The Zeppelin, http://www.centen-
nialofflight.gov/essay/Lighter-thanair/zeppelin/LTA8.htm (last visited June 8,
2005). The first zeppelin raid on London occurred on May 31, 1915, and the
zeppelin was able to fly higher than U.K. and French fighter aircraft. See id. One
article reported that zeppelins were able to reach an altitude of 13,000 feet. See
French Airmen's Exploits: Fight With a Zeppelin at 13,000 Feet, TIMES (London), Apr.
27, 1916, at 6.





218 See Friends of the Canadian War Museum, Fact Sheet: The Japanese Fire Bal-
loons, http://www.friends-amis.org/fireballoonse.html (last visited June 14,
2005); Greg Goebel, The Fire Balloons, http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avfusen.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
219 See Linda Voss, Balloons as Forerunners of Spaceflight and Exploration, http://
www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Ligh ter.thanair/Balloons-andSpace/
LTA17.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
220 See id.
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The U.S. Air Force also began a program of releasing un-
manned high-altitude balloons in 1956.221 The balloons were
launched from various locations around the world to conduct
atmospheric research. 222 However, at the same time, the U.S.
Air Force was launching similar balloons over the U.S.S.R. in an
attempt to gain intelligence.223 The intelligence gathering ef-
forts were not very successful. 224 The weather research cover
story was blown in early 1956 when the U.S.S.R. recovered one
of the balloons and developed the film it carried-the pictures
showed Soviet territory.225 President Eisenhower terminated
further launches by the U.S. Air Force of high-altitude balloons
in mid-March of 1956.226
After 1956, research conducted by high-altitude balloons has
continued. 227 NASA is currently developing an ultra-long dura-
tion balloon (ULDB) that is being designed to achieve flights of
up to 100 days. 2 28 The ULDB reached an altitude of 115,000
feet (21.8 miles or 35.1 kilometers) during tests in Australia in
2001.229 During a subsequent test of the ULDB in June 2006, it
reached an altitude of 25.7 miles (41.5 kilometers). 230 The bal-
loons are designed to lift a large telescope to an altitude of
221 TERRILL, supra note 148, at 5. In one operation, "Project Genetrix," 516
balloons were launched from locations in Europe. The balloons carried auto-
matic cameras and tracking beacons so that they could be recovered. See id. In
operation "Moby Dick," the U.S. Air Force released "some two thousand balloons
from various sites around the earth." Id.
222 Id. at 14 n.25 (noting that although some balloons were used for intelli-
gence gathering, some were actually only used for weather research).
223 Id. at 5-6.
224 Id. at 5.
225 See U.S.S.R. Note to the United States of Feb. 18, 1956, reprinted in 34 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 427, 428 (1956). The U.S.S.R. also asserted that the captured balloons
did not carry any instruments to measure basic meteorological elements. See id.
See also Russians Display Balloons of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1956, at 1. Coinciden-
tally, while the U.S.S.R. was protesting U.S. balloon flights, one of the Soviet
Union's meteorological balloons landed in Japan. See Waldemar Kaempffert, Sci-
ence in Review: Weather Balloons, to Which Russia Objects, Yield Data Useful to All Na-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1956, at Ell.
226 TERRILL, supra note 148, at 6.
227 See generally Linda Voss, Scientific Use of Balloons in the Second Half of the Twen-
tieth Century http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Lighter-than-air/Sci-
enceMissions-20th-Part II/LTA15.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
228 NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 16, 2005, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6981227/.
229 Voss, supra note 227.
230 Giant NASA Balloon Lifts Of [sic] from Esrange Space Center, SPACEMART, June
5, 2006, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/GiantNASABalloonLiftsOf_
FromEsrangeSpaceCenter.html.
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about 25 miles (40 kilometers). 2 '  The balloons will be
launched from Sweden and travel to Alaska but will not cross
Russia, which, demonstrating a claim of sovereignty reminiscent
of cold-war politics, has not granted permission for the balloons
to cross its territory.
232
Another NASA balloon, carrying the cosmic ray energetics
and mass (CREAM) experiment, traveled for forty-one days and
twenty-two hours after its launch in Antarctica on December 16,
2004.233 The balloon lifted the two-ton CREAM experiment to a
height of 125,000 feet (23.7 miles or 38.1 kilometers).23 4
After balloons, the United States used high-altitude aircraft to
gather intelligence on other countries.235 Besides the well-
known X-15, in the 1950s and the U.S. Air Force experimented
with many other high altitude vehicles.236 Using the Lockheed
U-2, the United States flew missions over the U.S.S.R. beginning
in late 1956.237 These missions provided very useful intelligence
but after the U-2 flown by Gary Powers was brought down over
the U.S.S.R. on May 1, 1960, the United States stopped these
missions as well.
238
231 See NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden, supra note 228; Spectacular Balloon
Flights from Esrange to Alaska this Spring, SPACE DAILY, Feb. 15, 2005.
232 See NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden, supra note 228.




237 See TERRILL, supra note 148, at 6.
238 Id. at 73 n.7. Even a year after the crashed U-2, some senior leaders in the
U.S. military did not think the United States had violated international law by
flying the aircraft over U.S.S.R. territory. See id. at 66. According to Terrill, in
1961, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Richard M. Montgomery, the Assistant
Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that Colonel Martin Menter
"didn't know what he was talking about" when Colonel Menter said the United
States had violated international law when Francis Gary Powers flew over the
U.S.S.R. in his U-2. See id. Colonel Menter was later promoted to Brigadier Gen-
eral and became a founding member of the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL), serving as president of the U.S. Association of the IISL, and as the
vice-president of the IISL for six years. Some contemporary writers also ex-
pressed the opinion that the United States had not violated the sovereignty of the
U.S.S.R. One such writer, Spencer M. Beresford, expressed several reasons why
the U-2 flight did not violate U.S.S.R. sovereignty: because the U.S.S.R. never
ratified the Chicago Convention, other states were not bound to recognize
U.S.S.R. air sovereignty (this argument ignores the fact that article 1 of the Chi-
cago Convention recognizes all states have sovereignty over their air space, even
the U.S.S.R. despite the fact that in 1960 it was not a party to the Chicago Con-
vention); the U-2 flights could not violate U.S.S.R. air sovereignty because the
term had not been defined (again, this argument ignores that even under the
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As mentioned in the introduction, the U.S. Air Force has re-
cently expressed renewed interest in operating vehicles for vari-
ous missions at high altitudes. The U.S. Air Force thinks
operating in this area will be less expensive than the cost of cur-
rent unmanned aerial vehicles or satellites and can cover gaps in
satellite coverage. 2 9  The vehicles under development are
lighter-than-air vehicles, glider-like vehicles, and hybrids (a
blend of airship and traditional aircraft).24O One concept in-
cludes launching a surveillance glider from a high-altitude bal-
loon.2 4 1 One Air Force officer implied that the glider could be
used to fly over other States.24 2 However, a U.S. Air Force attor-
ney recently said "we recogni [z] e fully that the existing laws and
treaties will apply in near space. At the altitudes that we are
talking about today for these specific technologies, it is air law
that will apply. '243 Several different vehicles have already been
tested and the operational altitude ultimately may reach 100,000
Paris Convention definition, the U-2 is an aircraft and it flies by generating lift
over its wings); the U-2 is a state aircraft so U-2 flights are not regulated by the
Chicago Convention (this argument again ignores the article 1 declaration that
all states have sovereignty over their air space); finally, he argues that sovereignty
should be based on effective control. See Beresford, supra note 194, at 109-13.
Mr. Beresford was special counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration and drafted the Committee's
report, Survey of Space Law. See SELECT COMMITFEE ON ASTRONAUTICS AND SPACE
EXPLORATION, SURVEY OF SPACE LAW, H.R. Doc. No. 86-89, at v (1959).
239 See William B. Scott, Near-Space Frontier: Vehicles Roaming the Edge of Earth's
Atmosphere Offer Military Potential, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 14, 2005, at 71
[hereinafter Scott, Near-Space Frontier]; Air Force May Spread Wings in Near Space,
CNN.com, Jan. 19, 2005, available at www.spacedata.net/newsO I1905.htm.
240 See Scott, Near-Space Frontier, supra note 239, at 71; Air Force May Spread Wings
in Near Space, supra note 239; Andrea Shalal-Esa, Air Force War Game Aims to Test
Space Technologies, YORKSHIRE CND, Feb. 5, 2005; Jefferson Morris, Near-Space Free-
Floating Balloons a Candidate for Quick Deployment, AEROSPACE DALY & DEFENSE
REP., Nov. 8, 2004, http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/space-war-
game.htm.
241 Morris, supra note 240, at 3.
242 See id. The article quotes a U.S. Air Force officer as saying:
The balloon floats "over to your area of interest, and then once
they've gotten [there], they release the glider and the glider goes
in a lazy circle .... The beauty of it is, you can recover the glider in
friendly territory, so if you have a high-value payload, you don't lose
it, like you do with these other free-floater concepts."
Id. (emphasis added).
243 Michael Sirak, US Air Force Sees Promise in 'Near Space, JANE'S DEF. WKLY.,
Oct. 13, 2004, available at http://www.spacedata.net/newsIO1304.htm (quoting
Major Elizabeth Waldrop, Chief of Space and International Law for U.S. Air
Force Space Command).
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feet (19 miles or 30.5 kilometers),244 well above the current limit
for conventional flight. In one test, the U.S. Air Force used a
balloon to carry a standard U.S. Army radio to an altitude of
65,000 feet (12.3 miles or 19.8 kin), increasing the radio's range
by almost 250 nm (288 miles or 463 kilometers).245 At one
point, the U.S. Air Force considered operating some of the vehi-
cles by the end of 2006.46
Other states are also working on high-altitude vehicles.24 v
The U.K. Ministry of Defence is testing a high altitude aircraft
called the Zephyr 3. 348 It is expected to fly to 132,000 feet (25
miles or 40.2 kilometers), higher than any other unmanned
aircraft.249
Some civilian businesses are also considering the use of high
altitude vehicles.25 ° One potential use for them is as communi-
cations relay stations. 251 High-altitude communication networks
based on lighter-than-air vehicles or aircraft operating in rela-
tively fixed locations at approximately 65,000 feet (12 miles or
20 kilometers) or higher are known as high altitude platform
stations (HAPS). 252 At this altitude. the HAPS are above the jet
stream so winds are relatively calm, and it is easier to keep the
platform in a stable location horizontally.253 HAPS offer several
advantages over satellite networks. 254 They are potentially less
expensive to field; they operate much lower than geostationary
communications satellites, so there is no transmission delay; and
they can be brought back down to earth for repair or equipment
upgrades.255
To take advantage of the communications potential of these
vehicles, HAPS must have access to the radio spectrum without
244 See Scott, Near-Space Frontier, supra note 239, at 71.
245 SeeJefferson Morris, Lord Briefs Jumper on Near-Space; Deployment Could Be Up-
coming, AEROSPACE DAiLY & DEFENSE REP., May 25, 2005.
2 4 See Shalal-Esa, supra note 240.
247 See Peter Almond, British Solar Spy Plane Rises to a Record Challenge, SUNDAY
TIMIES (London), Feb. 27, 2005.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See Sanswire Networks, What is a Stratellite?, http://www.sanswire.com/




254 See Mike Mills, Haig Floats a High-Tech Trial Balloon, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
1998, at F5.
255 See id.
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interference. 2 6 The International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), a United Nations affiliated international organization
that coordinates radio spectrum use to ensure radio frequency
users do not interfere with each other, has a long history of allo-
cating frequencies for use by vehicles in the atmosphere. 257 The
need for coordination was demonstrated by the orbiting of the
first man-made satellite: Sputnik reportedly caused radio inter-
ference in at least three states. 258 The frequency used by Sput-
nik had been assigned to a station in the Netherlands. 259 The
first ITU regulations relating to space telecommunications be-
came effective on May 1, 1961.260 In the 1990s, the ITU began
allocating frequencies for high-altitude platforms. 261 In 1997,
the ITU allocated the 47 and 48 gigahertz (GHz) bands for use
by HAPS. 262 In May 1997, the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission allocated the 47 gigahertz band for HAPS.263 In
2000, the ITU allocated the 31/28 GHz and 2 GHz bands for
use by HAPS. 264
Several concepts for HAPS-based communications networks
have been proposed.265 In the late 1990s, Sky Station planned
to launch up to 250 balloons that would hover at an altitude of
approximately 65,600 feet (12.4 miles or 20 kilometers) to trans-
mit internet, video, and phone calls. 266 One HAPS concept cur-
rently being designed and nearing testing is the airship platform
called Stratellite, which is being developed by GlobeTel Com-
munications Corporation.267 The Stratellite is a rigid airship.268
256 See id.
257 More specifically, "the ITU through its periodic conferences effects alloca-
tion of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assign-
ments, coordinates efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio
stations of different countries, and establishes general standards for equipment
and broadcasting techniques." See McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 633.
258 See Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, Regulatory Functions of L T. U. in the Field of Space
Telecommunications, 34J. AIR L. & COM. 62, 65 (1968).
259 See id.
260 See McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 634.
261 See Masayuki Oodo & Ryu Miura, A Study of Frequency Sharing and Contribu-
tion to ITU for Wireless Communication Systems Using Stratospheric Platforms, J. COMM.
REs. LAB., Dec. 2001, at 39, available at http://www.nict.go.jp/publication/shup-
pan/lcihou-journal/journal-vo48no4/toku3-2-1.pdf.
262 Id.
263 See Use of Radio Frequencies Above 40 GHz for New Radio Applications, 62
Fed. Reg. 43,116 (Aug. 12, 1997).
264 Oodo & Miura, supra note 261, at 39-40.
265 See, e.g., Mills, supra note 254, at F5.
266 Id.
267 See Sanswire Networks, supa note 250.
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It is being designed to stay aloft for long periods of time, up to
eighteen months.26 Other concepts are discussed by Ryszard
Struzak in his paper Mobile Telecommunications Via the
Stratosphere. 2 70
B. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO SPACE
Mr. Johnson, after initially opposing delineation, quickly
changed his mind and became an advocate of delineation.27 1 In
1959, he was cited asking for delineation as soon as possible and
suggesting the altitude of 25 miles (40.2 kilometers) as a limit
for vertical sovereignty.2 72 He pointed out the problems states
would have accessing space if vertical sovereignty was set too
high. In 1961, he said:
Regardless of the status of outer space, spacecraft must first move
through the territorial airspace to get there, and must move back
through the territorial airspace if they are to return to earth....
Now, the United States is fortunately situated geographically so
that the flight profile of Project Mercury presents no real prob-
lem .... Inevitably, it will become necessary to know in advance
whether the launch phase or the re-entry phase violates the terri-
torial airspace of another state....
I do not suggest that agreement on the upward limit of territorial
space will assist in distinguishing between what space activities
should be permitted and what should be prohibited in non-terri-
torial space. This is not the point. The point, rather, is that it
seems desirable that there be a clearly-defined limit to the power
of an individual state to declare unilaterally that certain activities
are impermissible in the space above it and, by so doing, to en-
gender an international legal dispute.27
In 1962, Mr. Johnson said
"[t] he area within which the underlying State possesses the right
to 'veto' the activity of another State must not be permitted to
extend to altitudes which would hamper the freedom of space
exploration. It is of little value to speak of the freedom of outer
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See Ryszard Struzak, Mobile Telecommunications Via the Stratosphere, http://
www.intercomms.net/AUG03/content/struzakl.php (last visited June 9, 2005).
271 See Monroe W. Karmin, Up in the Air, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1959, at 1.
272 Id.
273 Johnson, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 168-69.
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space if man cannot travel freely to that realm and freely back to
earth. 2
74
Finally, in 1964 Mr. Johnson said:
It might be argued that the freedom of outer space "for explora-
tion and use by all States in conformity with international law," as
affirmed by the General Assembly resolution, necessarily implies
freedom of access to outer space and, in the case of manned
space exploration, freedom of return from outer space, and that
there should therefore be no legal basis for protesting, merely on
grounds of unpermitted presence, the overflight of national ter-
ritory by ascending and descending spacecraft, regardless of alti-
tude. In other words, no individual State, by assertion of
exclusive control, would have the right to preclude access by an-
other State to outer space or return to earth from outer space
even at altitudes universally regarded as being within the territo-
rial air space. It seems most doubtful, however, that such an un-
qualified principle will ever gain general acceptance. Exclusive
control of the air space is so well-established that it is not likely,
in the absence of effective pre-launch inspection disclosing the
nature and capabilities of the craft involved, that an unlimited
right of passage will be accorded craft at altitudes where aircraft
may operate only with the prior permission of the underlying
State. But if the exclusive control of the territorial sovereign may
be invoked at altitudes of 10, 15, and 20 miles to exclude space-
craft not having prior permission, then at what altitude may one
invoke a right of free access to outer space and free return from
outer space so as not to require prior consent for the overflight
of national territory?
275
In the words of Professor Cooper,
Unless [the upper boundary of national airspace] is fairly close
to the earth's surface, few States will be able to put a satellite into
orbit... without passing through the national airspace of other
States. In other words, few States will be free of a political veto by
other States in planning orbital flights.
276
274 Carl Q. Christol, "Innocent Passage" in the International Law of Outer Space, 7
A.F. L. REv. 22 (1965), reprinted in CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 329, 331 (1991) (quoting a statement of Mr. Johnson in a NASA
News Release).
275 Johnson, Freedom and Control, supra note 7, at 141.
276 John Cobb Cooper, Legal Problems of Spacecraft in Airspace, reprinted in
COOPER, ExPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra note 25, at 305, 311. In 1965,
Professor Cooper said:
If the complete preventive jurisdiction of a State above its lands
and waters extends upward even fifty miles, future intercontinental
and orbital outer space flight will be seriously handicapped. Until
102 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [72
This is because spacecraft are not launched straight up:
[T] he creation of absolute sovereignty up to [60 miles or 90 kilo-
meters] places unnecessary constraint on trajectories of space
mission launchings or landings. Before achieving a desired orbit
the launch vehicle must pass at a slanting trajectory over substan-
tial segments of the earth. The amount of energy required for a
'vertical' launch in order to protect 'boundaries' would be exor-
bitant and practically insupportable. 27
7
The 1998 launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Ko-
rea (North Korea) of a long-range rocket highlighted the access
to space issue. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a
rocket from its Hawdaegun MISSILE Test Facility that flew "over"
Japan. 278 North Korea gave no advance notice or warnings of
the launch. 2 79 There is some disagreement over whether this
was a two-stage or three-stage rocket. 28 ° It may have been a
Taepo Dong 1 ballistic missile. 281' North Korea asserted that the
launch successfully orbited a satellite, a claim supported by Rus-
the time arrives when flight instrumentalities are available with al-
most vertical take-off into and subsequent descent from outer space
it will continue [to be] necessary to plan outer space flight with
gradual ascent and even more gradual descent. Few States are geo-
graphically located so that they can, without difficulty, plan outer-
space flight without assuming descent from outer space at altitudes
less than fifty miles above the surface territories of other States.
Cooper, Contiguous Zones, supra note 152, at 325. However, as mentioned above,
space tourist vehicles modeled after SpaceShipOne may operate within a very
narrow horizontal space, so transiting over another state's territory may not be an
issue for them. See generally supra text accompanying note 171.
277 S. Mishra & T. Pavlasek, On the Lack of Physical Bases for Defining a Boundary
Between Air Space and Outer Space, VII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 399, 403 (1982).
278 SeeJoseph C. Anselmo et al., Missile Test Extends North Korea's Reach, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 7, 1998, at 56; Paul Mann, Missile Defense Boosted, Despite Weak
Management, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26, 1998, at 34. The launch site is also
called "Nodong" and is located at 40 degrees, 51 minutes, and 17 seconds North
Latitude, 129 degrees, 39 minutes, and 58 seconds East Longitude. See Federa-
tion of American Scientist, No-dong, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/fa-
cility/nodong.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Federation of
American Scientist, No-dong].
279 See Kazuhiro Nakatani, The Taepodong Missile Incident and Emerging Issues of
Interpretation and Application of Space Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
SPACE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-FouRTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 144, 144 (2002).
280 Compare Graham Warwick, Phantom Satellite, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 7, 1998, at 37
(claiming that the rocket had three-stages), with Anselmo et al., supra note 278, at
256 (claiming that the rocket had two-stages).
281 See Nakatani, supra note 279, at 144; Warwick, supra note 280, at 37; Federa-
tion of American Scientist, No-dong, supra note 278.
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sia.28 2 The first stage landed in the sea 157 miles (253 kilome-
ters) downrange. 28 3 Apparently, the second stage (or possibly
the heat shield) flew "over" Japan and landed in the Pacific
Ocean 1023 miles (1646 kilometers downrange from its launch
point and approximately 348 miles (560 kilometers) from Ja-
pan. 284 This area is near international airway A590 where at the
time 180 aircraft flew every day.28 5 I have been unable to find
any information on the height of the rocket during its ascent
and while passing over Japanese territory. On July 5, 2006,
North Korea attempted another Taepo Dong 2 launch. 2 6 How-
ever, this launch failed so quickly that it is unclear whether the
launch was meant to orbit a satellite or test a ballistic missile.28 v
North Korea is not a party to the Outer Space Treaty, but the
Treaty recognizes that outer space is free for "all States. ' 28 8 Al-
though North Korea may not be an ideologically good example
of a state with access to space, geographically it is a good exam-
ple because, although it is a coastal state and the launch took
place from its coast, it still had geographic problems accessing
space. 281 As recently as 1999, Elizabeth Kelly said
[t]o date, as far as is known, space objects have not had to trav-
erse the airspace of foreign states en route to outer space. Cur-
rently, objects are launched vertically, either from launch sites in
states with large territories or from launch sites on or near the
high seas, substantially decreasing the possibility that a foreign
State's national airspace will be crossed.29 °
282 See North Korea Claims Taepo Dong I Orbited a Satellite, AEROSPACE DAILY, Sept.
8, 1998, at 377.
283 See Warwick, supra note 280, at 37. It landed at 40 degrees, 54 minutes
North Latitude, 134 degrees, 3 minutes East Longitude. See Anselmo et al., supra
note 278.
284 See Warwick, supra note 280, at 37. It landed at 40 degrees, 11 minutes
North Latitude, 147 degrees, 50 minutes East Longitude. See Anselmo et al.,
supra note 278, at 256. North Korea reported slightly different coordinates for
the impact locations of the two stages. See Phillip Clark, North Korea's First Satellite:
Fact and Fiction, 15 SPACE POL'Y 141, 141 (1999).
285 See Safety of Navigation, ICAO Ass. Res. A32-6 (Oct. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/res/a32_6.htm.
286 William B. Scott et al., Threat or Dud?; Frustrated International Community
Wrestles with NORTH KOREA'S In-Your-Face "Tests", Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 10,
2006, at 24.
287 See id.
288 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 6, art. I.
289 Kelly, supra note 166, at 37.
290 Id.
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Of course, North Korea's launch over Japan highlights the se-
curity concerns of other states.291 The Republic of Korea (South
Korea) called the launch an "invasion of Japanese Air Space. 292
This may have been a short-sighted statement on its part be-
cause South Korea is now in a similar position.293 In 2003,
South Korea broke ground on its own space center.294 The
center is being built near the town of Kohung on Oenaro Island
off South Korea's southern coast and was planned to be com-
pleted in 2005.295 Japan is concerned about the trajectory of the
launches from the South Korean launch site because the
launches will go near (or over) some Japanese islands. 296 Based
on its location, the South Korean launch site would have only
limited launch azimuths available without launching over Japa-
nese territory.297 If South Korea cannot launch toward the east,
its launch vehicles will not be able to take advantage of the ve-
locity of the Earth's rotation.298 Therefore, to launch a satellite
into orbit, South Korea's launch vehicles will have to be more
powerful (and therefore more costly) than vehicles launching
the same satellite from other locations that can launch east.299
291 See Analysis - E. Asia Anxious About Japan Response To N Korea, AsLA PULSE,
Sept. 4, 1998.
292 Id.




296 Interview with Professor Ram Jakhu, Associate Professor, McGill University,
in Montreal, Can. (May 10, 2005).
297 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, at 80.
The rotation of the Earth gives a rocket an eastward velocity even
before it is launched. If the rocket is launched to the east, it can
use this velocity to increase its speed. Since the speed of the Earth's
surface is greatest at the equator (0.456 km/s), launching from a
location at low latitudes (near the equator) increases the rocket's
speed and therefore increases its launch capability....
Similarly, if the rocket is not able to launch eastward, it cannot
take full advantage of the speed of the Earth's rotation, and this
reduces its launch capability. This can happen, for example, if the
satellite is being launched into a polar orbit, in which case the
rocket is launched toward the north or south. Or the launch direc-
tions may be restricted so that the rocket does not fly over popu-
lated areas early in flight.
Id. (footnote omitted).
298 Id.
9 For example, a Lockheed Martin Titan IVB could place 47,800 lbs (21,680
kg) into low Earth orbit (LEO), but only 38,800 lbs (17,600 kg) into a LEO polar
2007] THE VERTICAL LIMIT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 105
North Korea's launch site means it has even more limitations on
its launch azimuths unless it continues to launch its rockets
"over" its neighbors.
Putting aside sovereignty issues, a more practical problem
may be safety downrange from the launch site. One former U.S.
expendable heavy launch vehicle, the Titan lVB, had two solid
propellant rocket motors and a two-stage liquid propellant rocket core.3 °°
The first stage of the liquid core weighed approximately 17,600
pounds (8,000 kilograms) empty, and the second stage weighed
approximately 9,900 pounds (4,500 kilograms) empty.3 1 Each
solid rocket motor weighed approximately 95, 000 pounds (43, 100 kilo-
grams) empty.3 ° 2 All vehicle stages of these expendable launch
vehicles that do not reach orbit fall back to the surface of the
earth during the launch process. 3  Launch trajectories are
programmed so that the expended stages impact in the open
ocean "far from coastal areas. 3 0 4
Besides the danger posed by the falling spent boosters causing
damage by impact alone, the spent boosters may still contain
toxic chemicals.30 5 For example, the SS-18 intercontinental bal-
listic missile, which the Russian Federation is marketing as a
commercial space launch vehicle, has an expendable first stage
that contains up to a ton of unburned toxic fuel when it hits the
ground.3 0 6 One version of the SS-18 is fueled by 376,000 pounds
(171,000 kilograms) of nitrogen tetroxide (N 20 4) and an un-
symmetrical dimethylhydrazine compound. 7 The Titan V liq-
orbit. See OFFCE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, supra note 180, at 9.
Objects are placed into a polar orbit by launching them toward the north or
south. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, at 80. A polar orbit means the object in
orbit will pass over the Earth's poles. See id. at 23.
300 See U.S. AIR FORCE, TITAN IV FACT SHEET (1995), available at http://
www. losangeles. af mil/SMC/PA/FactSheets/ttn4_fs. htm.
301 See Andrews Space & Technology, Titan IVB Specifications, http://
www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/elvs/titan4bspecs.shtml (last visited May 11,
2005).
30. See GlobalSecurity.org, Titan IV Solid Rocket Motor (SRM), http://
www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/t4-config-5.htm (last visited May 11, 2005).
303 See U.S. AIR FORCE, SPACE DIVISION, Supplement to the Environmental As-
sessment, Titan TV Program 2-27 (1988) [hereinafter TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA]
(on file with author); Dene Moore, Oil Rigs Fear Hit from U.S. Space Junk, VANCOU-
VER SUN, Apr. 7, 2005, at A10 [hereinafter Moore, Space Junk].
304 TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, supra note 303, at 2-27.
305 SeeJames Oberg, Russians Harness Cold War Demons for Space, MSNBC.CoM,
Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6729146/.
306 See id.
307 See Federation of American Scientist, R-36M / SS-18 SATAN, http://
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36m.htm (last visited May 11, 2005).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
uid core stages are both fueled by Aerozine-50 (a mixture of
hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethyihydrazine (UDMH)) and
nitrogen tetroxide (N 20 4) .3 08 The first stage carries 342,000
pounds (155,000 kilograms) of propellant and the second stage
carries 77,000 pounds (35,000 kilograms) of propellant. 09
Some of the propellant is expected to be present in the spent,
suborbital stages that are programmed to fall into the ocean. 10
For the Titan III, the U.S. Air Force found that the remaining
solid and liquid fuel in the spent stages that fall into the ocean
would result in insignificant water pollution except "for worst
case situations involving highly unlikely combinations of
events. ' 31 1 However, these propellants are highly toxic; in Au-
gust of 2003, a leak of only forty gallons (152 liters) of N 20 4
during the fueling of a Titan IVB caused the evacuation of the
entire launch complex. 12
The Russian Federation recently obtained permission from
Turkmenistan for spent rocket stages from SS-18 intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles converted to civilian use and launched in
southern Russia (near Orenburg) to land in Turkmenistan. 13
However, for Russia's main launch site, Baikonur in Kazakhstan,
the permissible launch azimuths are limited to prevent spent
rocket stages from impacting in populated areas or within for-
eign states.3 1 4 For example, launches due east are not possible
from Baikonur because "lower rocket stages would fall on Chi-
nese territory. ' 315 "For those launch corridors which are used,
308 See GlobalSecurity.org, Titan IV Liquid Rocket Engine (LRE), http://
www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/t4-config-4.htm (last visited May 11,
2005).
3- See Titan IVB Specifications, supra note 301.
310 See TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, supra note 303, at 2-27; U.S. AIR FORCE, Final
Environmental Statement: United States Air Force Space Launch Vehicles 71
(1975) [hereinafter AIR FORCE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES EA], available at http://
ax.losangeles.af.mil/axf/eaapgs/docs/esslv275.pdf.
311 AIR FORCE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES EA, supra note 310, at 71-80. For the
Titan IV, the Air Force found that "relatively small amounts of propellant may
also be released into the ocean" in the spent stages and that "because of the small
amount of residual propellants present and the large volume of water available
for dilution, no significant impacts are expect to be caused by the reentry of
spent stages." TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, supra note 303, at 2-27.
312 See U.S. Air Force Print News Today, Rocket-Propellant Leak Cleaned, Aug. 14,
2003, http://www.af.mil/news/storyprint.asp?storyID=123005425 (last visited
Nov. 24, 2006).
313 See Oberg, supra note 305.
314 See Federation of American Scientist, Baikonur Cosmodrome http://
www.fas.org/spp/guide/russia/facility/baikonur.htm (last visited May 11, 2005).
315 Id.
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tens o thousands [sic] of tons of spent boosters, many with toxic
residual propellants still on board, now litter the countryside. 3
16
Although ground safety may not be as much of a problem for
some of the vehicles discussed previously that do not drop ex-
pended components (such as single-stage to orbit vehicles or re-
usable launch vehicles), it will continue to be a problem for
more conventional vehicles. 3 17 In January of 1995, six people
were killed and twenty-three injured on the ground in China
after the failure of a Chinese Long March rocket.318 In February
of 1996, another Long March rocket failed seconds after launch
and at least six more died and fifty-seven were injured. 19
In the North Korea example, Japan could rightly express con-
cern due to spent boosters falling near its territory. It is possible
that the rocket component that came down near Japan would
have descended below 62 miles (100 kilometers) while above
the territory of Japan. Obviously,
[s] erious problems might arise from the possible impact of spent
rocket parts on foreign territory, if a State whose territory does
not include any suitable location satisfying the safety regulations
normally imposed on launching sites should nevertheless wish to
construct its own facility and to launch its own satellites. In this
case, the co-operation of any State potentially affected by such an
enterprise has to be ensured, since safety measures will have to
be taken by this State, e.g., evacuation of certain areas, or ar-
rangements to clear the flight path below the space object from
international aviation.3 20
Professor Kazuhiro Nakatani argued that the launch by North
Korea violated provisions of several international conventions.3 2'
However, Professor Nakatani did not reach a conclusion on
whether or not the rocket's flight violated Japan's territorial sov-
ereignty because "there is no clear-cut delimitation between air-
space and outer space. ' 322 Because North Korea provided no
prior warning of the launch, Professor Nakatani wrote that the
launch violated annex 11 of the Chicago Convention and Inter-
316 Id.
317 See Marcia S. Smith, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial




320 Id. at 16.
321 See Nakatani, supra note 279, at 150.
322 Id.
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national Maritime Organization (IMO) Assembly Resolution
706.323 As Professor Nakatani pointed out,324 annex 11 of the
Chicago Convention was violated because North Korea failed to
provide prior warning of the launch to air traffic service authori-
ties as required by standard 2.17.1.325 The ICAO Assembly also
considered the launch without notice a violation of the Stan-
dards and Recommended Practices of the Chicago Conven-
tion. 26 North Korea deposited its notice of adherence to the
Chicago Convention on August 16, 1977.327
The launch violated IMO Assembly Resolution 706 because
member states are required to provide navigational warnings for
various reasons, including "missile firings, [or] space missions"
which might affect the safety of shipping, not less than five days
before the event.3 28 The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee re-
viewed the August 1998 launch by North Korea because the
rocket parts fell into major maritime trade routes and fishing
grounds and "had the potential of posing a serious threat to the
safety of navigation."329 The Committee invited member states
to strictly comply with recommendations contained in IMO As-
sembly Resolution A.706(17) . 3 ° North Korea joined the IMO
in 1986. 33'
323 Id. at 144.
324 Id. at 145.
325 SEE AIR TRAFFIc SERVICES, ANNEX 1 1 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION (13th ed. 2001). Standard 2.17.1 provides:
The arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil air-
craft, whether over the territory of a State or over the high seas,
shall be coordinated with the appropriate air traffic services author-
ities. The coordination shall be effected early enough to permit
timely promulgation of information regarding the activities in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Annex 15.
Id.
326 See Safety of Navigation, supra note 285.
327 See Status of Chicago Convention, supra note 67.
328 See World-Wide Navigational Warning Service, Annex 1 para. 4.2.1.3.12, IMO
Assembly Res. A.706(17), reprinted in International Maritime Organization, Adop-
tion of the Revised NAVTEX Manual, MSC/Circ. 1122, Annex 4 (May 24, 2004),
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/docid=3770/1122.pdf.
329 International Maritime Organization, Navigational Warning Concerning Oper-
ations Endangering the Safety of Navigation, MSC/Circ. 893, at 1 (Dec. 21, 1998),
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=821/893.
330 Id.
s33 See International Maritime Organization, IMO Member States with Year of
Joining http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topicid=315&docid=840
(last visited May 2, 2005).
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The United States is not immune from having its freedom of
access to space questioned. First, "launches made from current
[intercontinental ballistic missile] silos drop expended booster
stages on the United States and Canada. '332 The Liability Con-
vention imposes absolute liability on the launching state for
damage caused on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight
by the state's "space object" or the "launch vehicle and parts
thereof.'33 3 However, it is not clear if the Liability Convention
would cover damage caused by spent ICBM boosters because the
Convention does not specify when an object becomes a "space
object" and ballistic missiles do not go into orbit.33 4 Professor
Cheng concludes, however, that any object, including an ICBM,
launched to an altitude above 81 miles (130 km) is a space ob-
ject, 35 so the Liability Convention applies. 336 The same conclu-
sion was earlier reached by the U.S. Department of State. 7
While the U.S. Senate was conducting hearings on the Liability
Convention, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations wrote a letter to SenatorJ.W. Fulbright, the Chairman
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and said,
[i]t would therefore appear that any unintentional damage
caused by an ICBM would be covered by the Liability Convention
just as it is already covered by article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty. We believe the general tendency in case of doubt would
332 See SPAcy, supra note 175, at 77.
133 Liability Convention, supra note 15, Arts. I, II.
334 Id.
335 Bin Cheng, Definitional Issues in Space Law: 'Space Objects, 'Astronauts, and
Related Expressions, 34 SPACE L. COLLOQUIUM 17 (1991), reprinted in CHENG, SPACE
LAW, supra note 211, at 492, 498.
336 See Bin Cheng, International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities, 20
AIR & SPACE L. 297 (1995), reprinted in CHENG, SPACE LAw, supra note 182, at 599,
602.
37 Letter from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations, to Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations (Sept. 6, 1972), in SENATE COMM. ON FoREIGN RELATIONS, CONVEN-
TION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 92-38, app. at 8, para. 3 (1972). Assistant Secretary Abshire continued,
Furthermore, damage caused by the intentional launching of a mis-
sile against a foreign target would be a hostile act and under most
circumstances an act of war. As a general rule of international law,
subject to exceptions that need not concern us here, a multilateral
treaty such as the Liability Convention does not apply to conditions
of war or hostilities.
Id. para. 4.
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be to say that an object is a 'space object' within the meaning of
the Convention. 8
I have been unable to find any agreement between the United
States and Canada discussing this issue or granting the United
States authority to have spent ICBM boosters fall into Canadian
territory. However, the United States signed an agreement with
the United Kingdom in 1950 establishing a missile test range
covering portions of the Bahama Islands. 39 This agreement
covers the area generally downrange from the launch area of
the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, 4 ' and it was amended
several times.314
The access to space issue is broader than merely cases where
launch trajectories pass over foreign territory or booster debris
falls in foreign territory. As oceans become more and more eco-
nomically important and exploited, the issue will continue to
grow.
In April of 2005, Canada expressed concern that a spent
booster from a Titan IV planned to be launched from Patrick
Air Force Base in Florida would fall near a deep sea oil platform
near Newfoundland.34 2 The spent booster was expected to
weigh 22,000 pounds (10,000 kilograms) after the fuel was ex-
pended and was projected to fall within 15.5 miles (25 kilome-
ters) of the Hibernia oil platform. 43 The Hibernia platform is
about 196 miles (315 kilometers) southeast of SaintJohn's, New-
foundland, 4 4 well outside of Canada's territorial waters. The
338 Id.
339 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land Concerning a Long Range Proving Ground for Guided Missiles to be Known
as "The Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground," July 21, 1950, U.S.-U.K., 1
U.S.T. 545.
340 As noted above, the agreement created the Bahamas Long Range Proving
Ground and was in the vicinity of Cape Canaveral, Florida. See id. pmbl.
341 See generally, e.g., Agreement for a Tracking Station on Grand Bahama,
U.S.-U.K, May 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 4832; Agreement Regarding Bahamas Long
Range Proving Ground: Extension of Flight Testing Range, U.S.-U.K., Apr. 1,
1957, 8 U.S.T. 493.
342 See Moore, Space Junk, supra note 303.
343 See id.
344 See No Rocket Risk Acceptable, Williams Says, HALIrAx DAILY NEWS (Nova Sco-
tia), April 11, 2005, at 7; Foothills Search and Rescue, Hibernia Off-Shore Oil
Platform, http://www.foothills-sar.ab.ca/photos/Hibernia.html. Depending on
the exact location of the platform, it might even fall outside of Canada's exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), which is 200 nm wide. See Law of the Sea Convention,
supra note 98, art. 57. One article puts the platform at "350 kilometers east of St.
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booster's projected impact site is approximately 2,300 miles
(3,700 kilometers) downrange from the Titan IV's launch site.
A U.S. Air Force spokesperson said for all launches, the U.S. Air
Force Space Command devises an impact "box" and there is
only a one in one trillion chance of impact outside of the
planned box.34 The Hibernia platform was 1 mile (1.6 kilome-
ters) outside the box projected for the spent booster. 46 How-
ever, the Newfoundland government and the offshore oil
industry initially planned to evacuate the drilling platform.-47
Evacuating the platform would have included removing all oil
from the platform, capping all wells, and flushing lines-this
could have taken the platform out of production for up to two
weeks and would have meant a loss of $250 million. 4 Although
evacuating the platform might be prudent to avoid potential
(but apparently unlikely) loss of life, the cost of evacuation and
loss of profit would not be compensable under the Liability Con-
vention. 49 Ironically, if the booster hit the platform and killed
someone, the loss of life and property damage would be com-
pensable. Newfoundland's Premier, Danny Williams, said the
United States should offer compensation if "a shutdown is nec-
essary. ' 350 Canada's Defence Minister, Bill Graham, said "We
strongly urge the United States government not to follow this
trajectory but to choose a trajectory which will take their rocket
further away from these very important installations. 3 5' How-
ever, a U.S. Air Force spokesperson said that changing the tra-
jectory would mean more risk for mainland Canada and the
United States.3 5 2 The U.S. Air Force decided not to change the
John's," or approximately 189 nm (217 miles). See Missile Test Delayed After Spark-
ing Scare at Oil Platforms, CBS NEws, Apr. 7, 2005. http://www.cbc.ca/story/ca-
nada/national/2005/04/07/nfld-oil-050407.html.




349 See Liability Convention, supra note 15, Arts. I, II.
The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or other im-
pairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of
persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergov-
ernmental organizations.
Id. art. I(a).
350 Moore, Space Junk, supra note 303.
351 Dene Moore, U.S. Delays Atlantic Rocket Launch, LONDON FREE PREss (Onta-
rio), Apr. 8, 2005, at A3.
352 See Dene Moore, Rocket Risk to Nfld. Offshore Not New, Not Likely a Problem:
Space Analyst, CANADIAN PREss, Apr. 12, 2005 [hereinafter Moore, Rocket Risk].
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trajectory, and Premier Williams said he had been assured that
the rocket would be destroyed if it veered off course and
threatened the oil platforms.353 The satellite was launched on
April 29, 2005, and the spent booster caused no damage. 54
One space analyst thought the plan to evacuate the oil plat-
form was unusual because similar rockets had been launched
along the same trajectory for years without incident.3 55 How-
ever, the issue will probably arise again as the area becomes
more congested. At the time of the April 2005 Titan launch,
other oil platforms were in the general area besides the Hiber-
nia platform.3 56 The floating Terra Nova platform was approxi-
mately 217 miles (350 kilometers) east of St. John's.3 57
Domestically, access to space within the United States is also
becoming an issue. Several new spaceports are under develop-
ment, a number of which are situated away from coastal areas.3 58
However, the inland spaceports under development appear to
be aiming toward reusable launch vehicles and the suborbital
tourist market, so damage caused by expended boosters should
not be a problem. For this type of launch, coordination with air
traffic is the major concern.
Of course, agreeing on a vertical limit of state sovereignty will
not alleviate the safety issues discussed above. States will still
have to adopt and comply with international safety standards
when conducting space launches. But a treaty delimitating verti-




There are many different proposals for a demarcation be-
tween air and space and many different thoughts on whether or
not there is a need for demarcation. 59 Much of the problem
353 See Dene Moore, Nfld. Has Assurances About U.S. Missile Launch; Rigs Won't Be
Evacuated, CANADIAN PRESS, Apr. 14, 2005.
354 See Rocket Launch No Problem, LONDON FREE PREss (Ontario), May 1, 2005, at
7.
355 See Moore, Rocket Risk, supra note 352.
356 See Moore, Space Junk, supra note 303.
357 See Dene Moore, Proposed Rocket Launch Spurs More Concern For Nfld. Offshore
Platforms, CANADIAN PREss, Apr. 8, 2005.
358 See OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, supra note 180, at
32-49.
359 See GRIEF, supra note 30, at 40.
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stems from the fact that there is no clear physical boundary be-
tween air and space. 6 ' The Earth's atmosphere thins as altitude
increases. 6' Although after only a few miles it would be difficult
for humans to survive without artificial support, traces of gases
can still be measured even at altitudes as high as 10,000 miles
(16,000 kilometers) .362
The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) has been formally considering the definition and
delimitation of outer space since 1967.63 Several states, includ-
ing the United States, do not think that there is a pressing need
for demarcation.3 64 These states think that because the lack of a
definite boundary has not caused a problem to this point, de-
marcation should wait until there is a pressing need.365 Other
reasons against delimitation include:
- the possibility that any attempt at a treaty delimitating air and
space will encourage some states to make excessive sovereignty
claims;
- fears that the boundary may be established so high that some
space activities could be hampered;
- an understanding that fixing the boundary at a lower altitude
will not lessen the fear of some states that their security interests
are threatened;
- a fear that setting a boundary now may make it impossible to
change the boundary in the future, especially if the boundary has
to be lowered;
- a hope that it will be possible to establish a lower boundary in
the future than is conceivable noW. 3 6
6
One of the oldest proposals for delineating air and space is to
limit a state's vertical sovereignty at the physical point where
space begins. However, this is not a practical proposal because,
as mentioned above, there is no sudden natural dividing line




363 U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Historical Summary on the
Consideration of the Question on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, Provi-
sional Agenda Item 6(a) 1, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/769 (Feb. 19, 2002).
364 Id. 9, 12, 23.
365 Id.
366 See Robert F.A. Goedhart, The Never Ending Dispute: Delimitation of Air Space
and Outer Space, in 4 FORUM FOR AIR AND SPACE LAw 6-7 (Marietta Benk6 & Wil-
lem de Graaff eds., 1996).
367 See id. at 31-34.
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sovereignty to the uppermost altitude at which an aircraft is ca-
pable of flying. 68 This altitude has been estimated by Dr. Theo-
dore von Kdrmdn to be 275,000 feet (52 miles, or 83
kilometers) .369 However, this is not a practical solution because
advances in technology could change the maximum altitude
over time unless the definition of aircraft was very specific.3 70 I
also do not think this is a practical solution because it extends
state sovereignty too high. 7'
One traditional view was that, in order to exercise sovereignty
over an area, a state must effectively control it.372 A state's verti-
cal sovereignty thus would extend as high, or as low, as that state
could exercise its control.373 However, the idea of applying this
rule to vertical sovereignty claims was criticized by Professor
Cooper, who instead sought a uniform limit on sovereignty:
Certain jurists have insisted that the territory of a State is limited
by the ability of that State to make its law effective. This is a
harsh rule when applied to sovereignty in space. The richest and
most powerful States now have means through high altitude
rockets to control more or less effectively the "airspace" over
their surface territories. But the weaker States have no such
power. Can we be said to live in such a world where the physical
power at any one time of any particular State determines its inter-
national right to consider the region above its surface territories as
part of its national territory?... [T] he rule should be that every
State, no matter how small or how weak, as a State of equal sover-
eignty with every other State, has and should be admitted to have
territorial rights upwards above its surface territories as high as
the rights of every other State no matter how powerful.374
I agree with Professor Cooper's rejection of this theory of
demarcation.
Another proposal is a multi-level sovereignty regime first sug-
gested by Professor Cooper. 75 He suggested a low limit of terri-
torial airspace, a free outer space zone above, and a "contiguous
zone" in between:
36 See id. at 55-64.
369 Id. at 61.
370 Cooper, High Altitude Flight, supra note 32, at 263.
371 Professor Cooper would have agreed that this proposal set the limit of state
sovereignty too high; in 1965 he said that a limit of 50 miles was too high. See
supra note 32.
372 See Cooper, High Altitude Flight, supra note 32, at 263-64.
373 See Id.
374 Id.
375 Cooper, Contiguous Zones, supra note 152, at 325.
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The lower boundary of this contiguous zone might be the point
where normal airplane flight is practical and the upper boundary
just below the point where unpowered orbital flight can be made
effective. In such contiguous zone a subjacent State could exer-
cise the same preventive and protective jurisdiction as against for-
eign flight instrumentalities as it has in the airspace zone except
that rights of passage would be permitted for nonmilitary flight
instrumentalities when ascending toward or descending from
outer space above. 7 6
I disagree with this proposal because , essentially, it only creates
a limited right of passage. I think more freedom should be al-
lowed and therefore do not support this idea.
Shortly after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Dr. G.
Zadorozhni, a Soviet lawyer, proposed "freedom of the air, like
freedom of the high seas, should be declared for the region be-
yond 20 or 30 kilometres (12 or 18 miles) above the earth."3 77 I
agree with the low limit in Dr. Zadorozhni's proposal and think
it should have been pursued. In 1960, another Soviet lawyer,
Gennady P. Zhukov, wrote that if an agreement banning mili-
tary activities in space could be negotiated, a separate agree-
ment limiting the vertical sovereignty of states to "a relatively low
limit" could be achieved.17 8 Although the proposal was not too
specific, I agree that a low limit on State sovereignty is the best
solution.
Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. did not press forward with the two
proposals of Zadorozhni and Zhukov.3 79 In June of 1978, the
U.S.S.R. permanent representative to the United Nations pro-
posed an agreement that outer space begins at 100 to 110 kilo-
376 Id. Professor Cooper's proposal is reviewed and criticized by Robert F.A.
Goedhart, who concludes:
Cooper's three-zone theory is anything but a meaningful tool to
find a boundary between air space and outer space: at first
Cooper's numerical proposals were confusing and arbitrary, and fi-
nally they have proved to be untenable for scientific and technolog-
ical reasons.
Goedhart, supra note 366, at 71.
377 200th Circuit by Satellite To-Day, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1957, at 7.
378 Harry Schwartz, U.S. Plan to Put a Man in Space Is Ridiculed by Soviet Scientist,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1960, at 25. Mr. Zhukov was the Executive Secretary of the
Space Law Committee of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences at the time he made
the statement. See Robert D. Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law,
56 AM.J. INT'L L. 685, 687 n.6 (1962).
379 Robert D. Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 685, (1962).
116 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [72
meters (62.1 to 68.4 miles) above sea level.3"' This altitude
corresponds roughly to the lowest perigee of satellites up to the
time of the proposal. The theory behind the proposal is that
because no state can make claims of sovereignty in space and
most satellites have had a minimum perigee of approximately
100 kilometers or higher, then 100 kilometers is the highest alti-
tude that states can claim as their sovereign territory. Although
the 100/110 kilometer (62/68 miles) altitude was not meant to
be the final demarcation line, I think by proposing that altitude
the U.S.S.R. precluded any discussion of a lower demarcation
line. The U.S.S.R. presented a working paper outlining its pro-
posal in June of 1979.81 The first three proposals of the work-
ing paper were as follows:
1. The region above 100/110 kilometers altitude from the sea
level of the earth is outer space.
2. The boundary between air space and outer space shall be sub-
ject to agreement among States and shall subsequently be estab-
lished by a treaty at an altitude not exceeding 100/110
kilometers above sea level.
3. Space objects of States shall retain the right to fly over the
territory of other States at altitudes lower than 100 (110) kilome-
ters above sea level for the purpose of reaching orbit or re-
turning to earth in the territory of the launching State.382
The proposal showed that the U.S.S.R. thought that a right of
innocent passage had already been established because the pro-
posal said that space objects of states "shall retain the right to fly
over the territory of other States."38 3 As recently as 1996, the
Russian Federation still supported this proposal." 4 Martin Men-
ter agreed that a right of innocent passage existed.38 5 However,
380 U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 183d mtg. at 48-50, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/pv.183 (1978).
381 See U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Basic Provisions
of the General Assembly Resolution on the Delineation of Air Space and Outer Space and on
the Legal Status of the Geostationay Satellites' Orbital Space, Agenda Item 4(c), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/L.112 (1979).
382 Id.
3 Id. 3 (emphasis added).
384 See U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Questionnaire on Possi-
ble Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/635/Add.1, at 6 (Mar. 15, 1996), available at http://www.unoosa.org/
pdfi/reports/ac1051/AC105_635AddlE.pdf.
385 Martin Menter, Status of International Space Flight, in INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 67, 72
(1980).
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others argue there is no customary right of innocent passage for
access to space.' 86 The ICAO observer to the legal subcommit-
tee of the COPUOS presented a paper in 1986 stating that the
right of innocent passage was a proposal that did not reflect ex-
isting law. 8 v Professor Chistol noted in 1965, "[t] he major argu-
ment against the development of a rule of international law
permitting innocent passage of spacecraft is that the practical
dangers to the subjacent state are too profound to permit such
close approach by transiting vehicles." '88
One reason Russia may be trying to obtain international rec-
ognition of the right of innocent passage of space vehicles is that
the geographic location of its principal launch site, Baikonur
cosmodrome in Kazakstan, limits its potential launch azi-
muths. 9 The Russian Federation, however, has taken a few ac-
tions somewhat contradicting its claim of a right of innocent
passage.39 ° First, the Russian Federation allows other states in-
nocent passage through Russian airspace to enter outer space
and to return to Earth if given prior notice.39 If a right of inno-
The third paragraph of the USSR proposal at the COPUOS 1979
meeting recites a right to overfly other States' territory below 100/
110 kms, in going into orbit and in returning to the launching
State. This would codify what I believe is currently customary inter-
national law-a State having a right of onward passage in transiting
a nearby State's airspace in traveling to and returning from outer
space.
Id. Professor Carl Q. Christol also thought that a right of innocent passage ex-
isted, arguing that the U.N. General Assembly resolutions and the lack of formal
protests by states against
the orbiting of space vehicles for peaceful purposes at whatever alti-
tude, very strongly suggest that just as there has developed a princi-
ple of customary international law that such orbiting is lawful, this
principle must carry with it the practical corollary that innocent
passage through the air space following launch and during return
must be a permitted use of sovereign airspace.
Christol, supra note 274, at 338.
386 See Kelly, supra note 166, at 41.
387 See RamJakhu, International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemination of
Satellite Imagery, 29J. SPACE L. 65, 77 n.38 (2003) (quoting from ICAO Doc. C-WP/
8158).
388 Christol, supra note 274, at 338.
389 See supra notes 314-316 and accompanying text.
390 See RussianFederatopm Act on Space Activity 1993, Decree No. 5663-1 of
the Russian House of Soviets, art. 19(4) translated at http://www.oosa.unvienna.
org/SpaceLaw/national/russian-federation/decree_5663-1_E.html.
391 Id. The provision states:
The space object of a foreign state can execute a single innocent
flight through the air space of the Russian Federation with the pur-
pose to insert such an object into an orbit around the Earth or
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cent passage already existed in international law, there would be
no necessity of including it in Russian domestic law. 92 Also, the
Russian limitation that the right only exists if Russia is given
prior notice would appear to contradict the norm Russia advo-
cates; although, from a safety perspective this makes sense.393
Second, as mentioned above, the Russian Federation recently
obtained permission from Turkmenistan for spent rocket stages
to land in Turkmenistan. 94 Again, if a right of innocent passage
already exists, there may be no need for such an agreement.
However, from a safety perspective, this also makes sense.
To enable vehicles such as Hypersoar to operate freely, both
the 1979 U.S.S.R. proposal and Professor Cooper's proposal
must be modified to allow unlimited nonmilitary, or non-state,
activity rather than only for vehicles ascending or descending
from orbit. 95 This is required because a Hypersoar-type vehicle
would never go into an orbit.3 96 Also, for the descent phase, the
1979 U.S.S.R. proposal only allows innocent passage for space
objects returning to the territory of the launching state.3 97 So
vehicles involved in inter-state transport would not be entitled to
innocent passage.3 98 Therefore, I do not support either Profes-
sor Cooper's multi-level sovereignty proposal or the 1979
U.S.S.R. proposal.
In 2002, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Con-
gressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, introduced H.R. 3616 which
would have prohibited the U.S. from using or developing space
weapons.3 99 The bill also defined space as the area starting at an
altitude of 37 miles (60 kilometers) .400 The bill did not pass.
further in outer space, as well as with the purpose to return it to the
Earth under the condition of advance noting of appropriate ser-
vices of the Russian Federation about time, place, trajectory and




394 See supra text accompanying note 313.
395 See Cooper, Contiguous Zones, supra note 152, at 325.
396 See id.
397 See supra text accompanying note 382, para. 3.
398 See id.
39 H.R. 3616, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.89&filename=h3616ih.pdf&direc-
tory=/disk2/wais/data/ 107_cong-bills.
400 Id. § 7.
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Dr. Gbenga Oduntan recently provided a detailed review of
many different demarcation theories.4"' Dr. Oduntan proposes
a multi-level sovereignty theory similar to Professor Cooper's,
with a limit of state sovereignty at an altitude of approximately
55 miles (88.5 kilometers).402 For the reasons discussed above, I
do not support this proposal. One of Dr. Oduntan's conclu-
sions is that "the demarcation line must not be too low; as this
would put a Space vehicle launcher at the mercy of surrounding
states through whose airspace its vehicle must pass, on its way to
or from outer space. Thus, all the low demarcation line theories
must be rejected."4 3 Similarly, Dr. Oduntan reaches the conclu-
sion that to ensure a state's security, the demarcation line "must
not be too high." 40 4 I also do not agree with these conclusions
and think a low demarcation line would provide greater free-
dom to launching states.
B. FUNCTIONALISM AND SPATIALISM
Some states and scholars subscribe to the functionalist view. 40 5
"The essence of the functionalists' argument is that the locus of
an act need be of no moment to its legality or illegality, which
can be determined solely by reference to its nature. '4 6 This
view takes the position that objects in space should be governed
by space law, and objects not in space should be governed by air
law.4 ° 7 The existing space law treaties were written in a function-
alist way to avoid the boundary problem.4"8 For instance, the
Outer Space Treaty does not define space.4"9 As discussed
above, the Liability Convention does not define the term space
object.410 Finally, the CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION of Objects
Launched into Outer Space [the Registration Convention]4 1'
401 See generally Dr. Gbenga Oduntan, The Never Ending Dispute: Legal Theories on
the Spatial Demarcation Boundary Plane between Airspace and Outer Space, 1 HERTFORD-
SHIRE L. J. 64 (2003), available at http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uhinfo/library/
i89918_3.pdf.
402 Id. at 82.
403 See id.
404 See id.
405 See e.g., Cheng, The Boundary Problem, supra note 182, at 445.
406 Id.
407 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 40.
408 See generally, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 6.
409 Id.
410 See supra text accompanying notes 334-336.
411 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer SpaceJan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
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does not explicitly define the term "space objects," but specifies
that certain information about objects launched "into earth or-
bit or beyond" must be provided to the Secretary General of the
United Nations.412
Mr. Menter frequently expressed a functionalist view and ar-
gued against the need to delineate a boundary between air and
space.4 13 Writing shortly after the signing of the Outer Space
Treaty, he said:
Space law writers, it is to be hoped, may agree that the proposed
treaty-in declaring outer space free for use by all states, and in
declaring that the exploration and use of outer space is to be
guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance
with due regard for the corresponding interest of other states-
should abate past pressures for determining just where sover-
eignty ends and free outer sFace begins. Those pressures should
be further abated by the functional approach. For example, the
treaty's prohibition against the orbiting of weapons of mass de-
struction applies to any vehicle in orbit, regardless of the dis-
tance of the orbit from the surface of the earth. Protection of
the state was what led historically to firm claims of sovereignty
over the territorial sea and to a nation's superadjacent air space.
Protection of the subjacent state will argue against agreement to
any fixed distance so long as equal danger may exist from above
such a point.414
The opposing perspective is the spatialist view.415 Those sub-
scribing to this view think that a definitive demarcation line
should be drawn between air and space.41 This would impose a
vertical limit on state sovereignty. Professor Cheng discussed
the interplay of the functional and spatial views:
It will be readily perceived.., that the functional classification of
activities of States into those that are lawful and those that are
unlawful follows-and not precedes-spatial delimitation. Contrary
to the view of some functionalists, spatialism does not mean do-
ing away with a functional classification of what is a lawful activity
and what is not, but to apply a functional test without regard to
where an activity takes place is not only to put the cart before the
horse, but to dispense with the horse. Under general interna-
412 Id. arts. I-1V.
413 Martin Menter, The Developing Law for Outer Space, 53 A.B.A. J. 703, 705
(1967).
414 Id.
415 See Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the Definition and
Delimitation of Outer Space, supra note 398, 1 11.
416 Id.
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tional law, there are in fact few activities of States that are either
universally lawful or universally unlawful. Most of the time, it de-
pends on where an activity is carried out. Thus the answer to the
question, for instance, whether a State may arrest a foreign vessel
or not for monitoring its electronic defen [s] e [sic] installations
will depend not on the nature of such actions but primarily on
the locus, i.e., on whether the act of intelligence-gathering and
the arrest are carried out in a State's own territory, in the terri-
tory of another State, on the high seas, in no man's land, or in an
area which is the common heritage of mankind; and secondarily
on the relationship between the State and the vessel, i.e., on
whether the ship has the nationality of the State, has no national-
ity or has a foreign nationality.417
Later in the same article he wrote:
To say that spatialism should give way to functionalism in interna-
tional law or in international space law would be like saying, in a
nominally federal State, that everything should be treated as a
federal matter to be governed directly by federal law. This would
eliminate at a stroke all the rights and laws of the constituent
states or provinces which after all are only a form of spatialism.
In the same way, functionalism in the matter of defining outer
space, by asserting that, insofar as 'lawful' space activities (their
'lawfulness' being no doubt defined in the end by the mere say
so of the major space powers) are concerned, they may be con-
ducted anywhere in the world without spatial restriction, is in ef-
fect implying that such activities may be carried on even in the
national airspace of other States. Under functionalism, States
would, therefore, lose the right which they have by reason of
their sovereignty, to control or in any way interfere with self-
styled 'lawful' foreign space activities in their national
airspace.418
I agree with Professor Cheng.
One concern with any spatial approach would be how to es-
tablish a uniform vertical limit: what happens over mountain
ranges or deep valleys? 419 This same problem was examined in
1910 by Dr. J. F. Lycklama ! Nijeholt:
Were the surface of the earth smooth and even, the airfrontier
would be at the same height up in the air all over the globe,
smooth and even also. The earth's surface, however, being far
from smooth, we are faced with the alternative, must the limit of
417 Cheng, The Boundary Problem, supra note 182, at 437.
418 Id. at 443-44.
419 See id.
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sovereignty be measured from some certain, recognized, univer-
sal mark, or must it follow all the ups and downs of the soil?
A strong argument against the first solution would be that one
would be obliged to place the limit at a very great height to make
sure that the highest parts of the soil do not tower above the
sphere of sovereignty. This solution is, moreover, unjust towards
high lands, these getting the limit of their authority much nearer
their territory than low lands do.
The second solution, making the airfrontier follow every uneven-
ness of the soil, seems to be much more reasonable. But there
are sound objections also against this one. For assuming such a
limit of the authority in the air, means taking a measure which
will be a great nuisance for everyone who has to reckon with it, a
measure, moreover, that is very unjust towards low lands, as the
atmosphere certainly does not follow all the ups and downs. The
air being much thinner on the top of a high mountain than at is
[sic] base, the addition of a sphere of sovereignty of the same
extent above high lands and above low lands, will put these two
categories of countries in a different position towards aerial navi-
gation. For the high land an airdomain of considerably little
height will be sufficient to bring almost all aerial traffic below its
air boundary. For the low land on the contrary an airdomain of
the same height will be of little value, aerial navigation being able
to remain without much difficulty beyond the airboarders of
such a state. At any rate, aeronauts find above the airfrontier of
the low land a zone that is far more favo [u]rable for breathing
and for aerial navigation than the zone they find above the
airdomain of high lands. Accordingly it will be much easier to
keep or get out of the way of the authority of the low land than of
the high land.
Both solutions are unequal and unsatisfactory. The objections
against the horizontal limit, it seems to us, are unable to be
removed.420
This problem is similar to that encountered during the debates
about how to determine historic bays and "baselines" for the ter-
ritorial seas.421 Unfortunately, those rules became very compli-
cated4 22 and many international incidents have occurred
because of differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea
Convention.4 23
420 NIJEHOLT, supra note 37, at 31-32. Dr. Nijeholt went on to argue against a
vertical limit on State sovereignty. See id. at 32-33.
421 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
422 See Id.
423 See infra notes 429-447 and accompanying text.
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C. FILLING A GAP IN THE LAW
Although as mentioned above many people think that from a
legal perspective space "begins" at 100 kilometers, not everyone
agrees.4 24 Referring to HyperSoar, the authors of one article
wrote that "the space plane's high altitudes would make foreign
airspace restrictions irrelevant" although HyperSoar would
never ascend above 100 kilometers.425
In the 197 0s as the U.S. space shuttle neared operation, many
legal experts thought that its deployment would necessitate de-
lineation of air and space. Mr. Menter, however, wrote that the
space shuttle should not change the conclusion he made about
delineation in 1967 because the space shuttle cannot maneuver
in the atmosphere like a traditional aircraft and therefore is not
a threat.4 2 6 "I believe a subjacent State's tolerance of the flight
of a future aerospacecraft above it will continue to depend on
whether such craft constitutes a present danger rather than
whether it is plus or minus a few miles of a fluctuating demarca-
tion line whose height above it is dependent upon its terrain
elevation. 427 However, in 1964, Mr. Johnson rejected a similar
argument:
Resorting again to the analogy of the sea, it is obvious that the
ability of the same vessel to sail close to shore and in the middle
of the ocean, utilizing with equal facility the territorial waters and
the high seas, has never suggested that there should be no defin-
able limit to the exclusive power of the littoral State, even though
agreement on such a limit is difficult to achieve....
Similarly, the prospect that a single craft may eventually operate
at all altitudes in the air-space continuum does not mean that
there is no need to limit with precision the exclusive power of the
underlying State. In fact, it probably emphasizes the need for an
eventual solution.428
Elizabeth Kelly discussed the impact of "spaceplanes," and al-
though she did not propose a specific boundary, she argued
against extending State sovereignty up to 100 kilometers:
424 Lowe & Levine, supra note 189.
425 Id.
426 Martin Menter, Legal Regime of International Space Flight, in INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 126,
134 (Mortimer D. Schwartz ed., 1979) [hereinafter Menter, Legal Regime].
427 Id.
428 Johnson, Freedom and Control, supra note 7, at 141-42.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Spaceplanes able to fly freely through airspace and outer space
are a very real reason for maintaining flexibility as regards de-
marcation between airspace and outer space. They bespeak the
imprudence in advocating that states establish a boundary at
100kn, customarily or conventionally. Such a boundary might
leave enough of a cushion of airspace for conventional aircraft,
but it might not be low enough for spaceplanes to operate effi-
ciently and escape claims of violation of airspace sovereignty.429
While pointing out the necessity of defining the limit of verti-
cal sovereignty, Professor Cheng pointed out that states claiming
territorial seas of various widths never caused a problem because
each state knew how much the other states claimed:
The statement has sometimes also been made that no great harm
has arisen out of the lack of a general agreement on the precise
outer limit of the territorial sea and the same should be true of
territorial space, but this ignores the fact that, although there is
no general agreement, the precise limit of the territorial sea
claimed by the coastal State is always known. °
Professor Cooper made a similar argument:
It has been said that there is no general agreement as to the
outer boundary of territorial waters and this fact has been used as
an argument to support delay in reaching agreement as to the
boundary between the airspace and outer space. The argument
is unsound so far as it applies to our national action. It overlooks
the fact that every State which has maritime boundaries has for-
mally asserted a fixed outer boundary for its territorial waters so
that no other State can question its position.431
Unfortunately, although it may be possible to determine the
claim made by states, both of these statements miss one impor-
tant point: although states frequently published their maritime
claims, these claims are not always understood, uniformly inter-
preted, or recognized by other states and many problems have
arisen. Professor Cheng discussed an incident in which a U.S.
radio frequency intelligence ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo, was seized
in 1968 and its crew held for almost eleven months by North
Korea.432 The United States said the ship was in international
waters about 25 miles (40 kilometers) off the coast of North Ko-
429 Kelly, supra note 166, at 111.
430 Cheng, The Boundary Problem, supra note 182, at 446.
431 John Cobb Cooper, The Boundary Between Territorial Airspace and International
Outer Space, reprinted in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw, supra note 25,
at 298, 300.
432 See Cheng, The Boundary Problem, supra note 182, at 446.
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rea when it was boarded, although North Korea claimed it had
intruded into its territorial waters.433
Incidents of this nature are not uncommon.43 4 One infamous
example of the dangers involved occurred in the Corfu Chan-
nel.435 On October 22, 1946, two U.K. destroyers were severely
damaged and many sailors died after the ships struck sea mines
while steaming through the Corfu Channel.436 The channel is
between Albania and Corfu Island and is within Albania's terri-
torial waters. 437 The mines that damaged the U.K. destroyers
were placed in the channel by Albania.4" 8 Albania acknowl-
edged the existence of the strait, but denied that it was an inter-
national waterway and asserted that foreign warships required
prior authorization to use the strait.4 39 The International Court
of Justice found Albania responsible for placing the mines in
violation of international law.44" As recently as the year 2000,
Albania still required prior authorization for foreign warships to
enter its territorial sea.44 1 In the early and mid-1980s, the
United States and Libya clashed several times over Libya's claims
to the Gulf of Sidra.442 In 2001, Libya still claimed the Gulf of
Sidra as internal waters.443 More recently, in 1992, a U.S. Navy
submarine collided with a Russian Navy submarine apparently
because the two states did not recognize the Russian territorial
claims uniformly. 444 The United States claimed the submarine
was 14 miles (22.5 kilometers) offshore at the time of the inci-
433 See Neil Sheehan, North Korea Seizes Navy Ship, Holds 83 on Board as U.S. Spies,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1968, at 1. The United States said the ship was located at 39
degrees, 25 minutes North Latitude and 127 degrees, 54.3 minutes East Longi-
tude. See id. U.S. Rear Admiral John V. Smith said the ship was 16 nm (18.4
miles or 29.6 kilometers) from the coast when the confrontation began. Id.
However, the U.S.S.R. delegate to the U.N. Security Council said the ship in-
truded into North Korea waters at 39 degrees, 17 minutes, and 4 seconds North
Latitude and 127 degrees, 46 minutes, and 9 seconds East Longitude. Excerpts
from U.S. and Soviet Statements in U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1968, at 6.






440 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
441 COHEN, 2000 REPORT, supra note 108, app. H.
442 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 18.
443 COHEN, 2001 REPORT, supra note 116, app. H.
444 Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 128.
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dent,445 although Russia claimed the submarine was 4.7 miles
(7.6 kilometers) within its territorial waters.44 6 The collision ap-
parently occurred because Russia claimed a straight baseline
across the Kola Bay.4 4 7 "[B]ecause of the differing baseline cal-
culations, part of the claimed Russian territorial sea lay in what
the [U.S.] considered to be international waters." 448 At the
time, retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Robert Long said that in
the past "the Russians have made extravagant claims for their
territorial waters." '449 Recall the greatly exaggerated maritime
claims of the U.S.S.R. discussed above.
Similar incidents may be avoided in the future in the air by
explicitly defining the extent of a state's vertical sovereignty.
D. PROPOSING A BOUNDARY
The ultimate goal, when reasonable security needs are met,
should be of course, after the model of the oceans, the fullest
inclusive use of airspace. Economic considerations strongly sug-
gest that with respect to airspace, as with respect to the oceans,
outer space, and other sharable resources, the greatest produc-
tion of values can be secured through the fullest inclusive use.45 0
I agree that the territorial sea model should be adopted to
define vertical sovereignty. A process similar to the evolution in
the law of the sea's codification of territorial sea limits could
occur in the atmosphere to define the vertical limits of state sov-
445 David Evans, Insider to Probe Collision of Subs, CHIcAGo TRIB., Feb. 20, 1992, at
5. 446 Izvestia: CIS and US Sub Collision Was in Russian Waters, ITAR-TASS, Feb. 20,
1992.
447 Astley & Schmitt, supra note 96, at 128 fig. 7 (depicting the territorial sea
boundaries as determined by Russia and the United States).
448 Id. at 128.
449 Evans, supra note 445.
450 McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 279 (footnotes omitted). Although
they did not propose a specific altitude for a boundary, Professors McDougal,
Lasswell, and Vlasic wrote later in their book that if a demarcation was
established,
the line separating the region of a comprehensive, exclusive com-
petence from that of inclusive competence [can] be drawn as low
as states can be persuaded to agree. Such a temporary upper
boundary could be set high enough to provide reasonable protec-
tion for traditional airspace uses, as long as this protection is gener-
ally demanded. The closer to the surface of the earth such a
boundary could be fixed the greater of course would be the protec-
tion of the common interest in expanding inclusive use.
Id. at 356 (footnote omitted).
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ereignty. I propose a 12 nm limit. This equates to 72,912 feet
(or 22 kilometers). The area above 12 nm would not be subject
to state sovereignty. It would be treated in a manner similar to
airspace over international waters.4" The standards and proce-
dures adopted by ICAO would be mandatory. Vehicles operat-
ing above 12 nm would have to comply with ICAO standards.
Any rule delineating vertical sovereignty must be extremely
simple to avoid the problems demonstrated in the territorial sea
analogy. For vertical sovereignty, a more uniform result could
be achieved by ignoring mountain ranges and other geographic
features. The limit could be set in a manner similar to aircraft
"flight levels, '4 5 2 but by using satellite positioning, or some other
accurate positioning system, to determine vertical position
rather than barometric pressure. Although this solution pro-
duces the problem noted by Dr. Nijeholt above,45 the 12 nm
vertical limit is so high that it will include all current commercial
aviation. Also, the simplicity of this rule will mean that states
should not be able to adopt different interpretations.
As stated above, setting the limit at this altitude would not
interfere with current aviation, because the limit would be well
above the maximum altitude of current commercial aircraft.
454
In the United States, the maximum altitude for commercial air-
liners is effectively limited to 40,000 feet (12 kilometers) due to
FAA regulations.455 This is because it is impossible for airliners
with wing-mounted engines to meet technical standards re-
quired by FAA regulations to operate at higher altitudes.456
However desirable a low vertical limit of state sovereignty is
from either a freedom of access to space or a freedom of naviga-
tion in space perspective, it seems likely that many states will be
451 Chicago Convention, supra note 23, art. 12. This article provides in part,
"[o]ver the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this
Convention." Id. This means the international standards and procedures
adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are mandatory
over the high seas. See id. art. 37.
452 AbsoluteAstronomy.com, Flight Level, http://www.absoluteastronomy.
com/encyclopedia/f/fl/flightilevel.htm (last visited June 14, 2005).
453 See supra text accompanying note 420.
454 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 42 (asserting that aircraft have a flight ceiling of
"about 12 miles, [although] the upper limit of effective aerodynamic lift is con-
sidered to be about 25 miles above the earth" (footnotes omitted)).
455 Andrew Doyle, FAA Pressed on Altitude Limits, FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 8, 2005, at
17.
456 Id. The applicable FAA rule is Standards for Approval for High Altitude
Operation of Subsonic Transport Airplanes 61 Fed. Reg. 28,684 (June 5, 1996) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 25).
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reluctant to agree to a low limit. First, because under the func-
tional perspective that exists in current treaties, satellites in orbit
operate beyond individual state's sovereignty, "States would be
unlikely to accept 25 miles as the upper limit of their territorial
sovereignty when they could claim considerably more than this
without interfering with satellites in earth orbit."45 Second,
states will be reluctant to allow freedom of navigation if they are
unable to immediately benefit from it. States with no ability or
desire to operate vehicles in this region may be unwilling to
enter into an agreement granting another state's vehicles land-
ing rights, especially if the foreign carrier is competing with a
domestic carrier. Professor Cheng elaborated on this issue:
A solely functional approach of allowing the airlines to fly wher-
ever there is traffic, while seemingly most rational can, in the pre-
sent what economists would call conditions of very imperfect
competition, lead easily to the entire industry being completely
dominated, if not forever monopolized, by a few strong carrier
nations. Interestingly enough, such nations have always been
championing the cause of complete freedom of the air. The par-
allel between aeronautics and astronautics . . . should not be
overlooked by those interested in the definition of outer
space.
45 s
Later in the same article, Professor Cheng wrote:
While among space powers or near-space powers, [a right of
transit], in the expectation of reciprocity, may be easily granted,
the same can hardly be said of States which have no aspiration to
go into space. The price the latter will exact will probably be
proportionate to their strategic importance for the passage of
space objects. In any event, if air law is anything to go by, it is
most likely that States will wish to distinguish between military
and non-military space objects, and, amongst the latter, possibly
between commercial and non-commercial, and between nuclear
and non-nuclear space objects.4 5 9
States may not want to give up the possibility of using their
geographic location to gain economic benefits by demanding
fees for overflight rights.46 ° Writing of aircraft transit issues, Pro-
457 GRIEF, supra note 30, at 43.
458 Cheng, The Boundary Problem, supra note 182, at 443.
459 Id. at 453.
460 According to Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic:
Fear of competition, opportunities for unilateral grab, prospects of
easy enrichment without concomitant investment or risk, and the
like-the motives which have been for decades growing in the
shadow of "exclusive and complete sovereignty" over territorial air-
2007] THE VERTICAL LIMIT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 129
fessor Peter P.C. Haanappel said that "States with large territo-
ries are in the best political position to use overflight rights as a
bargaining tool, commercial or political, in individual negotia-
tions with other States. Often, large States have important com-
mercial air routes crossing their territories."461  Russia
apparently already charges non-Russian airlines "royalties" for
the right to fly over its territory in contradiction to the non-dis-
crimination provision of article 15462 of the Chicago Conven-
tion.463 In addition to the royalties it charges, Russia has some
of the highest air navigation charges in the world.4 6 4
State security is also often cited as the major argument against
a low limit on vertical sovereignty.46 5 For example, according to
Professor Cheng:
The foremost consideration that will influence the attitude of
States in reaching a decision on [the exact height of national
sovereignty] will be ... that of national security. While it is true
that in these days of reconnaissance earth satellites and intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, any system of na-
tional defence [sic] based purely on physical distance seems
ruefully obsolete, yet if the history of air law offers any guide,
States will most probably prefer to claim the greatest height prac-
ticable as the limit of their national space . *.. 466
But security fears should be no greater than already exist today.
States can already orbit weapons above other States and surveil-
lance has long been accepted. A potential enemy at an altitude
of 12 nm would be no closer than is already allowed by the law
of the sea or across a land border. The ability to actually maneu-
ver above 12 nm and remain there for any period of time is very
space-should not, of course, be allowed in the future to stand in
the way of common interest.
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 25, at 279 (footnotes omitted).
461 Peter P.C. Haanappel, Recent European Air Transport Developments: 1992-93,
XVIII:I ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 133, 143 (1993).
462 Article 15 of the Chicago Convention provides in part: "No fees, dues or
other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the
right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a
contracting State or persons or property thereon." Chicago Convention, supra
note 23, art. 15.
463 Michael Milde, Some Question Marks About the Price of "Russian Air", 49 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR Lurr- UND WELTRAUMRECHT [Z.L.W.] 147 (2000), reprinted in 2
MICHAEL MILDE ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 226, 226 (2004).
464 Id. at 229 (citing ICAO Doc. 7100 (1999)).
465 See e.g., Bin Cheng, From Air Law to Space Law, reprinted in CHENG, SPACE LAW,
supra note 182, at 35 (footnote omitted).
466 Id.
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difficult,467 so there should be few immediate threats posed by
this proposal. Territorial seas as buffer areas for security are al-
most meaningless today because of bombers with intercontinen-
tal range, long-range carrier-based attack aircraft, submarine
launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and various other
weapons.46 In addition, states have always had to contend with
land borders that provide no security buffer.
Finally, states have always had a right to take action outside
their borders to protect their security,4 69 and setting a low verti-
cal limit on state sovereignty will not change this right. A 12 nm
vertical limit of state sovereignty should not be objected to for
security concerns. States should not be allowed to claim exten-
sive vertical sovereignty based on outdated security concerns.
Some states have recently realized that they can enhance their
security by allowing aircraft of other states to fly over them for
surveillance."' The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a regime
467 According to M.V. Smith:
Between the ceiling of aviation and the floor of astronautics, there
is a region nearly 65 miles wide that divides air and space. This is
the transverse region, wherein neither aerodynamic flight nor orbi-
tal rotation is possible....
Operations inside the transverse region are not practical because
the energy expenditures required to maneuver there are too great.
Vehicles can exploit neither Bernoulli's aerodynamic principles
nor Kepler's astrodynamic principles to maneuver or conserve en-
ergy. Consequently, the transverse region lives up to its name as a
boundary across which vehicles travel but in which they can do little
else.
M. V. Smith, TEN PROPosrriONs REGARDING SPACEPOWER 5-6 (2002).
468 MURCHISON, supra note 85, at 55 (noting radars observing an attack at a
range of 2000 miles would only provide approximately three hours of warning
time).
469 U.N. Charter art. 51. See Becker, U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 82, at 6.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reserves to each of the
members of the United Nations an 'inherent right' of' individual or
collective self-defense against armed attack. It is immaterial
whether the attack originates in or passes through outer space in
order to reach a member state. In such a case, that state has the
right to defend itself ....
Id. See also Goedhart, supra note 366, at 74 ("Whenever a State finds itself
threatened from outer space, it is still free, pursuant to article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, to act in self-defence outside national air space."); Johnson, Freedom and
Control, supra note 7, at 142 ("The extent of territorial sovereignty is not the test
in [security] matters; the fight of self-defense is not confined to actions within
the defending nation's own territorial jurisdiction.").
470 See Treaty on Open Skies art. I., Mar. 24, 199, S. TREAv Doc. No. 102-37
(1992).
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for states to conduct observation flights over the territories of
other states' parties.4 71 There are currently thirty parties to the
treaty.472 The United States and Russia have agreed to allow 42
annual observation flights by aircraft from other states over their
territory.473 Although this treaty only grants a limited right to
other states, it may be an indication that some states do not see
overflight by foreign aircraft as a security threat and may allow a
lower vertical sovereignty limit.474
As recently as the 1950s, unification of the territorial limits
within the law of the sea looked difficult to achieve. However,
although a few problems still exist, the limits of territorial claims
by coastal states have been unified in a relatively short period of
time. This shows that states recognized the value of the greatest
possible freedom of navigation over the seas and were willing to
limit their own security interests to obtain the corresponding
benefits. Hopefully states will recognize the long-term benefits
of setting a low vertical limit of state sovereignty. The economic
drag created by extensive vertical state sovereignty will be a big
hurdle to overcome. In this respect, the words of Professor
Haanappel regarding sovereignty over air space apply:
Even in 1944, when the Chicago Convention was drafted and
opened for States' signatures, many States reali[z]ed that the ab-
sence of the right of innocent passage in international civil avia-
tion could hamper the development of international air
transport. Frequently, international air routes cross a multitude
of foreign territories. Negotiating overflight rights with each in-
dividual nation concerned may be extremely cumbersome and
time-consuming. 475
Even with overflight rights guaranteed by bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements, airlines frequently find conditions placed on
471 Id.
472 The 30 states that are Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies are: Belarus,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and United
States. Kyrgyzstan has signed but not yet ratified. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Fact
Sheet: Open Skies Treaty, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2004/33147.htm (last
visited June 7, 2005).
473 James A. Baker III, U.S. Dep't of State, Letter of Submittal (Aug. 12, 1992),
reprinted at S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37, at 6, 13.
474 See id.
475 Haanappel, supra note 461, at 142.
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their entry into a foreign state's airspace.4 76 For example, the
United States now requires commercial aircraft flights originat-
ing in foreign states destined to land in the United States or
overflying United States territorial airspace without landing to provide
names and other information on everyone on-board the air-
craft.477 If the vertical limit of state sovereignty continues up to
the point where orbital mechanics are possible, obtaining the
number of overflight rights through bilateral agreements re-
quired for a simple trip by a Hypersoar-type vehicle could be
very cumbersome and time-consuming. Existing bilateral agree-
ments for aircraft would probably not be considered to apply to
a Hypersoar-type vehicle, so new agreements would have to be
negotiated. Although bilateral agreements would still be re-
quired to allow a Hypersoar-type vehicle to descend into a for-
eign state's territorial airspace to land, fewer would be required
than if an agreement was needed for every state that the vehicle
passed over.
Mr. Becker, in his address to Congress in 1958 discussing the
law of the sea, said that the "United States Government believes
that the 3-mile limit, which affords a maximum freedom of the
seas, is in the best interests of all states-large and small, old
and new."478 The same holds true for vertical sovereignty. Al-
though it is probably impossible to turn back the idea of total
sovereignty over airspace, it may be possible for states to see the
benefits of setting a low vertical limit to state sovereignty.
E. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONS IN NEAR SPACE
Whether or not my proposal on delineation is accepted, even-
tually vehicles of various types will begin operating in the near
space area. It is important that international standards be devel-
oped to ensure these vehicles are designed to be safe and oper-
ate safely in harmony with existing air traffic. The question is
who will develop the standards and when they will be developed.
In 1956, Professor Cooper argued that ICAO was the best in-
ternational organization to regulate and control the "use of all
areas of space for non-military purposes. '47 9 Professor Cooper
had the general subject of outer space sovereignty placed on the
476 See, e.g., id.
477 Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and
Aircraft, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,820 (Apr. 7, 2005).
478 Becker, Political Problems, supra note 87, at 834.
479 Cooper, Upper Space, supra note 79, at 277.
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agenda for the Tenth Session of the ICAO World Assembly in
June 1956.480 Although the issue was discussed at the meeting,
the United States took the position that international discussion
of space sovereignty was premature and Professor Cooper's pro-
posal was tabled. 48  But, in its report, the ICAO legal commis-
sion wrote:
the Commission noted the growing interest among jurists in the
problems concerning "Outer Space." It considers that these
problems fall essentially within the province of the functions of
the Organization and that, at a suitable time, they might be in-
cluded in the general work program of the Legal Committee.482
After the flight of Sputnik, the ICAO President, Walter
Binaghi, wrote to the U.S. ICAO Council Representative asking
if it was time to consider the issue of sovereignty in outer
space.483 However, based partially on U.S. opposition, President
Binaghi agreed to delay ICAO consideration of this issue, al-
though some other states wanted ICAO to proceed on the sub-
ject.484 One of the reasons the United States opposed ICAO
authority over space after Sputnik was that the U.S.S.R. was not a
party to the Chicago Convention.4 85 Professor Cooper also ad-
mitted that once Sputnik was launched, ICAO lost its chance to
coordinate space law for the same reason. 486 However, the
U.S.S.R. became a party to the Chicago Convention on October
15, 1970, and Russia is a member now. 48
7
480 TERRILL, supra note 148, at 20.
481 Id. at 25.
482 International Civil Aviation Organization, Legal Commission Final Report and
Minutes, Assembly-Tenth Session, 6 para. 12, ICAO Doc. 7712, A10-LE/5 (1956),
available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/alO/docs/alOle02.djvu.
483 TERRILL, supra note 148, at 28.
484 Id. at 29.
485 Id. at 30.
486 John Cobb Cooper, The Russian Satellite-Legal and Political Problems, 24J. AIR
L. & COM. 379 (1957), reprinted in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW,
supra note 25, at 279, 285.
Until the Russian Satellite was launched, I had hoped that [interna-
tional control of space] could be lodged in the International Civil
Aviation Organization, created under the Chicago Convention.
That is no longer practical. The U.S.S.R. has taken the lead. ICAO
had an opportunity in 1956 to express its views about upper space
when it was on the agenda at the Caracas Assembly. It failed to do
so. The U.S.S.R. is not a member of ICAO. Only the United Na-
tions itself can now serve as a forum for further discussion.
Id.
487 Status of Chicago Convention, supra note 67.
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Mr. Menter frequently argued that ICAO should have jurisdic-
tion over space flight.4 8 He argued in favor of giving ICAO re-
sponsibility for space activities as well as air activities, writing that
"much governing regulation would tend to be similar. '4 9 Some
may argue that COPUOS would be a better organization to co-
ordinate international space activities, but "the ICAO approach
need not remove UNCOPUOS of its responsibilities. '4 ° Profes-
sor Paul Larsen wrote:
It must be emphasized that ICAO cannot leave regulation of
outer space activities to the U.N. Committee for Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space because that committee is not concerned with avia-
tion, only with outer space. Rockets and space vehicles in air-
space will remain unregulated, unless ICAO enters the field or
unless a new central space agency assumes this function.49'
According to Professor Hamilton DeSaussure, "the implementa-
tion of the legal problems which will emerge from advanced use
of Outer Space are far beyond the competence of COPUOS. Al-
though a permanent committee with continuing staff assistance,
COPUOS is best suited for creating hallmark principles, but not
for detailed regulation and amplification. 49 2 However, Profes-
sor DeSaussure thought a new agency should be created and
proposals for a "super ICAO style agency" were "too drastic, too
unrealistic, and too costly."49
I think ICAO is the proper organization to help develop stan-
dards for operations in near space. Using ICAO to develop stan-
dards for near space activities would allow utilization of an
efficient, established, international organization with almost
48S Martin Menter, Legal Responsibility for Outer Space Activities, in INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 121,
125 (1984) ("As to international surveillant authority, I have long favored a long
range expansion of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s re-
sponsibilities to include space flight.").
489 Menter, Legal Regime, supra note 426, at 129.
490 Id. at 132.
491 Paul B. Larsen, Space Activities and Their Effect on International Civil Aviation,
in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTI-
CAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER
SPACE 159, 164 (1967).
492 Hamilton DeSaussure, Evolution Toward an International Space Agency, in IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL
FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF
OUTER SPACE 32, 35, 36 (1977).
493 Id. at 37.
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universal membership." 4 ICAO has over fifty years of experi-
ence drafting standards that help ensure flight safety. ICAO has
also successfully drafted several treaties that have now been
widely ratified. It could translate this experience into the near
space realm. Giving this authority to ICAO would avoid the fol-
lowing problems: the large expense of creating a new interna-
tional treaty organization; waiting for states to ratify the new
treaty; waiting for the new organization to hire personnel and
develop internal rules; and the creation of a rivalry over jurisdic-
tion, funding, and relevance between ICAO and the new organi-
zation that would be created if ICAO is not given authority for
near space.
Standards should be written covering the following issues:
crew licensing, crew composition, vehicle safety, range safety,
publication of launches, coordination between launch sites and
air traffic control, publication of notices to mariners, use of ex-
pendable boosters, hazardous residue remaining in spent boost-
ers, operation of I-APS, orbit locations for HAPS, and many
other areas. Although the Liability Convention could apply to
near space operations if an international agreement delineating
space is developed and ratified, for passenger travel in near
space it may be better to modify the Montreal Convention.49 5
ICAO would be instrumental in doing this.
These standards will be needed sooner or later. I think it
would be better to start working on them now when there is
time to thoroughly think them through rather than rushing to
fix a problem after something goes wrong. I think ICAO is the
best organization to start developing these standards and ICAO
could relatively quickly obtain the expertise needed to do this.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no international agreement on the vertical limit of
state sovereignty. Today, the need to settle this gap in the law is
growing in importance. It is time to delineate the vertical extent
of a state's sovereignty. State sovereignty should be limited to a
low altitude-I recommend 12 nm. Like the 12 nm limitation
on territorial waters found in the Law of the Sea Convention,
this low limit will allow the greatest freedom for all states to util-
ize the near space area. Although few states are in a position to
494 There are currently 188 States that are parties to the Chicago Convention.
See Status of Chicago Convention, supra note 67.
495 See Montreal Convention, supra note 15.
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make use of this freedom now, in the long term, all states should
benefit from setting a low limit on vertical sovereignty.
Space tourism and other vehicles capable of operating in the
near space area are nearing commercial feasibility. Interconti-
nental hypersonic vehicles are being planned. A low limit on
state sovereignty would allow these vehicles to operate freely
without being obstructed by a political veto from the underlying
state. Overflight rights would not be required which would save
all the time and effort required to negotiate the web of air
transit agreements now required to operate an international
airline.
More and more states are developing their own domestic
space launch capability. Few of these new space powers will be
able to freely access space, or utilize the most efficient launch
azimuths, if neighboring states can claim sovereignty up to even
62 miles (100 kilometers). They will have even more difficulty
returning objects to Earth if the boundary is set at that altitude.
Even the United States and Russia are facing limitations on their
ability to freely access space. Setting a low vertical limit on state
sovereignty will ensure all states have equal access to space.
States should not be able to object to neighboring state's vehi-
cles merely because of the vehicle's location. However, to en-
sure safety along with free access, uniform rules for operation of
these vehicles are required. States should work together to de-
velop international standards for operation of these vehicles so
that they are designed and operated safely. There may not be
much activity in the near space area now, but there will be in the
future. It is time to start working for the day when vehicles are
routinely operating in this area. There is time now to thor-
oughly consider and implement appropriate rules. This is not
something that will go away if ignored. The first step is defining
the vertical limit of state sovereignty. Setting this will force
states to get past their security concerns and focus on safety.
I recommend that ICAO be given authority to create Stan-
dards and Recommended Practices for vehicles operating in the
near space area. ICAO has much experience drafting similar
rules for operation of aircraft; rules for vehicles operating at
higher altitudes should be similar. Using ICAO will speed up
the process by avoiding the creation and staffing of a new inter-
national treaty organization. It will also save money because it
should cost less to increase the staff of ICAO instead of creating
a new organization from scratch.
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Defining the boundary between a state's sovereign territory
and free "outer space" will also add clarity to all of the treaties
that are currently written in a functional manner without defin-
ing where "space" begins. Finally, defining the vertical extent of
a state should preclude future conflict among states that would
arise if, or when, states begin making territorial claims up to dif-
ferent altitudes.
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